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Nuclear and radiological terrorism is a persistent threat to United States national 
security.  The research and development of new technological capabilities is vital to 
bolstering emergency response and prevention capabilities in support of national security 
initiatives.  This research characterized the applicable trade-space for a system of 
unmanned vehicles deployed for search, detection, and identification of radiological 
source material.  Exploration included the development of a CONOPS, a functional 
decomposition and physical allocation, design considerations, and an analysis of 
feasibility and utility.  The concept system comprises of a ground control station, ground 
vehicle, hybrid-electric multirotor, and fixed-wing vehicle with an open architecture 
permitting the exchange of payload components.  Payload options include a Geiger-
Müller detector or scintillator for large area search and a scintillator or high purity 
germanium semiconductor for radioisotope identification.  Endurance estimates revealed 
that a hybrid-electric multirotor is capable of carrying a 6.8-kilogram payload for 58 
minutes.  Similar estimates indicated that a battery-powered fixed-wing vehicle can 
provide a minimum of 41 minutes of endurance with a payload mass fraction of 15% 
(1.36-kilogram payload), whereas a gasoline-powered vehicle with the same payload 
mass fraction (1.95-kilogram payload) can operate for 12 hours.  Electric multirotors are 
limited to a maximum endurance of 20 minutes, which is insufficient for radiological 
search missions.  The system concept proves effective to the radiological search mission 
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TRADE-SPACE ANALYSIS OF A SMALL UNMANNED VEHICLE SYSTEM 
FOR RADIOLOGICAL SEARCH MISSIONS 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
Overview 
 The purpose of this research is to characterize the applicable trade-space for a 
small unmanned vehicle system (SUVS) to conduct search, detection, and identification 
of radiological and nuclear materials.  The system will comprise a combination of 
airborne and ground platforms with integrated radiation detectors to complete a 
radiological search mission with input from a human operator. Both the platforms and 
radiation detectors suitable for the platforms will be discussed to understand the 
limitations and feasibility of employment.   
Background 
Compared to chemical and biological weapons, which also fall under the weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) umbrella, nuclear and radiological materials utilize more 
sophisticated and technical processes in order to produce quality material for use.  Due to 
this complexity, terrorist organizations are unlikely to produce their own materials and 
must acquire them through illicit means.  These materials are characteristically secured 
and monitored during production, transportation, storage, and use so that they are not 
compromised.  However, there are also large quantities of material available on the black 
market due to deficient security and accountability from previous decades.  Due to the 
numerous uses and locations of radiological and nuclear materials, the opportunity for 
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these materials to fall outside of responsible control and be utilized in nuclear terrorism is 
a very real threat to national and international security.  In order to locate and secure 
these materials, federal, state, local, and international partners deploy personnel, 
technology, and other investigative methods to detect and interdict illicit radiological and 
nuclear materials before being weaponized.  As stated by President Trump in the 2018 
National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism, “as the threat 
of WMD terrorism continues to evolve, however, our defenses against it must evolve as 
well” [1].  
As part of the counter-WMD mission space, it is necessary for law enforcement 
and military organizations to be able to detect, locate, and confirm radioactive source 
material within moderate to large-sized geographic areas.  Intelligence gathering may 
provide advanced knowledge of personnel, vehicles, infrastructure, location, and intent 
associated with radiological materials.  However, the radiological search mission is still a 
difficult and potentially dangerous logistical problem that is traditionally accomplished 
by personnel with handheld detectors.  Depending on the quantity and activity of the 
radiological isotope as well as the delivery method of an assembled WMD, hazards exist 
from both the radioactive material and the weapon’s delivery system.  Detectors capable 
of confirming radiological materials must be operated and sometimes placed within short 
distances of source material for long periods of time to produce accurate and usable data.  
Radiation exposure from highly radioactive material can cause health effects or even 
death if too much time is spent near the material.  Furthermore, explosively driven 
WMDs present the potential for severe injury or death if detonated near responding 
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personnel.  The capability to find, locate, and confirm the existence of these hazardous 
materials utilizing an unmanned system would be a valued asset that could mitigate these 
hazards to personnel.   
Research and development of unmanned vehicles for radiological response began 
in the 1970s with the reactor meltdown at Three Mile Island, which was further expanded 
with the second global nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1986 [2]. There are many sources 
of research that have looked at optimizing detector technologies, configurations, and 
software to effectively detect, locate, and map radiation strengths [3]–[8].  There are 
commercially available systems that utilize detector technologies to provide usable data 
to an operator about radiation concentrations as well as real-time video imagery [9].  
These systems have only been commercially available for a matter of years, and with 
constantly improving hardware and software, this is an area that will continue to progress 
and provide a more accurate and practical product to the end user.  However, there is 
little research looking at utilizing a system of UVs to accomplish radiological search 
operations.  The development of this system poses unique challenges due to the differing 
unmanned platforms: vehicles capable of rapid search may not be capable of dwelling 
near a target, while vehicles capable of long dwell times generally have short mission 
duration and are incapable of quickly covering large geographic areas. Creating a flexible 
system with multiple platforms and multiple integrable detectors allows the use of one 
system in several configurations to accomplish a variety of detection, location, and 




Several hazards endanger personnel when conducting radiological search 
operations.  There are potential health effects from the radiation being emitted from the 
source material, as well as threats from enemy combatants and potential deterrent devices 
in contested areas.  Radiation exposure should be kept as low as reasonably achievable, 
commonly known by the acronym ALARA [10].  The concept of the ALARA principle is 
to expose the minimum amount of people to the minimum amount of radiation for the 
minimum amount of time. The same principle can also be applied to the other inherent 
dangers of radiological WMD search that are posed by enemy combatants, which would 
be to limit time on target to minimize the risk to responding personnel.  Therefore, the 
development of an unmanned vehicle system for radiological search could contribute to 
the radiological search mission by reducing hazardous exposures to personnel and 
minimizing the number of personnel required for search operations.   
Research Objectives 
As mentioned in the background, the threat of WMD terrorism is ever present and 
capabilities need to be continually developed and improved to counter their employment 
[1].  Establishing a system of UVs for the detection, location, and identification of 
radiological and nuclear materials can assist in this mission set and act as a force 
multiplier for law enforcement and military organizations.  Several research objectives 
have been established to fully characterize the system of UVs that could be developed for 
radiological search operations: 
1. Characterize the SUVS trade-space for radiological search missions 
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2. Develop the system framework along with the system limitations, 
capabilities, and design considerations 
3. Assess the operational feasibility and utility from a functional and scenario 
perspective 
For the purposes of this research, a trade-space analysis frames the solution space 
in which a viable and feasible result may reside [11].  When considering a radiological 
search SUVS and the research objectives identified above, several questions arise that 
will assist with addressing the objectives and the concept system design. What 
radiological sources are of the most interest?  Which detectors are suitable for finding 
these sources and can be incorporated on an unmanned platform?  What are the operating 
characteristics and limitations of these detectors?  What would a shared system 
architecture consist of in terms of similar and differing components for radiological 
search and detector integration?  
Methodology Overview 
This research is a targeted mission area analysis scoped at the feasibility and 
suitability of a SUVS in support of radiological search and geolocation missions.  The 
methods include a survey of the existing state of technology for both radiological 
detection and unmanned vehicle capabilities, the development of a concept of operations 
(CONOPS), a system decomposition, and an analysis of the feasibility and utility of the 




The focus for this research is limited to sealed radiological and nuclear source 
material search, detection, location, and confirmation.  A sealed source is any radioactive 
material that is encased in a manner that prevents leakage or escape of the material [10].  
The encasement’s primary purpose is to prevent the spread of contamination during 
regular use or transportation of the material.  Radiological sources can be found in 
medicine, agriculture, industry, transportation, research, construction, geology, and 
mining.  These sources are regularly lost or stolen, which can lead to weaponization in 
the form of a WMD.  This research is not addressing WMD-related hazards or tactics, 
techniques, and procedures for operating in the vicinity of suspect WMDs.  Additionally, 
this research is not focusing on nuclear and radiological incident consequence 
management operations that address the spread of contamination to people and the 
environment [12].  
Previous Work 
A previous Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) graduate student researched 
various radiation detector technologies to be flown on a small autonomous unmanned air 
vehicle and developed algorithms to rapidly detect, locate, and identify radiation sources.  
Another AFIT graduate student investigated the use of employing chemical sensors on 
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in a tactical environment. The research focused on 
developing and employing tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) reconnaissance and surveillance utilizing 
small UAS [13].  This research was used as a starting point for this thesis.   
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Preview of Thesis 
This thesis is written in a traditional format. Chapter II discusses terminology, 
existing technologies, and previous research regarding radiation detectors and unmanned 
platforms. Chapter III addresses the methodology used to characterize the unmanned 
system and radiation detection trade-spaces.  The findings and results from trade-space 
analysis are detailed in Chapter IV.   The thesis is concluded with Chapter V, which 
reviews the research findings and presents potential avenues for additional research.   
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II.  Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
 This chapter will cover the fundamental science of radiation detectors to better 
understand the different parameters that may affect design decisions for equipping an 
unmanned vehicle.  Furthermore, current unmanned technologies will be discussed to 
provide background information on the current state of technology that is available 
through commercial sources or pre-existing government systems.    
Types of Radiation 
There are multiple forms of radiation that are typically categorized by charged 
particle emissions and uncharged radiation.  Charged particle radiation includes alpha 
particles, beta particles, and fission fragments.  Uncharged radiation includes neutrons, 
gamma rays, and x-rays.  X-rays, alpha particles, and beta particles are typically 
measured for contamination monitoring or for surveying and assessing a consequence 
management scenario (e.g. post nuclear detonation).  Gamma rays and neutrons travel 
orders of magnitude further than alpha or beta particles, making them better suited for 
initial detection and location of radiological material [14].  Within the confines of the 
radiological search mission space and this research, gamma rays are the primary radiation 
of concern.  
Gamma rays are photons with energies typically in the kilo- and mega-electron 
volt (keV, MeV) range.  These photons are typically emitted when an excited nuclei 
transitions to a lower energy level, with the gamma energy determined by the differential 
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of the excited and ground states of the nucleus. Many radioisotope decay events, such as 
alpha particle emission or nuclear fission, produce subsequent gamma photons in order to 
maintain nuclear stability [14].   
Radiological Sources of Concern 
 There are over one thousand isotopes that have been found or created on earth, 
with the large majority being radioactive.  Of the hundreds of radioactive isotopes, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) developed a list of isotopes that have 
hazardous direct human health effects when exposed to a sufficient quantity of said 
isotopes over a period of time.  Using this list, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC), working with the Department of Energy (DOE) and other agencies, established a 
list of 16 radionuclides of concern that, if gathered in significant quantities based on 
radioactivity (measured in Terabecquerels or Curies), carry the greatest risk of being 
incorporated into a radiological dispersal device (RDD) by terrorists (Table 1).  The 16 
threat isotopes can be found in most developed countries and are commonly used in 





















Americium-241 60 1,620 0.6 16.2 
Americium-241/Be 60 1,620 0.6 16.2 
Californium-252 20 540 0.2 5.4 
Cobalt-60 30 810 0.3 8.1 
Curium-244 50 1,350 0.5 13.5 
Cesium-137 100 2,700 1 27 
Gadolinium-153 1,000 27,000 10 270 
Iridium-192 80 2,160 0.8 21.6 
Plutonium-238 60 1,620 0.6 16.2 
Plutonium-239/Be 60 1,620 0.6 16.2 
Promethium-147 40,000 1,080,000 400 10,800 
Radium-226 40 1,080 0.4 10.8 
Selenium-75 200 5,400 2 54 
Strontium-90 1,000 27,000 10 270 
Thulium-170 20,000 540,000 200 5,400 
Ytterbium-169 300 8,100 3 81 
 
Categories of Radiological and Nuclear WMDs 
 In the realm of WMDs, there are a few types that encompass the radiological and 
nuclear category, which are radiological dispersal devices (RDD), radiological exposure 
devices (RED), and improvised nuclear devices (IND).  INDs are different from RDDs 
and REDs in that they use fissile materials, such as Uranium-235 or Plutonium-239, in 
order to create a nuclear yield through a nuclear fission chain reaction.  They can either 
be an illicit nuclear weapon that is bought, stolen, or obtained from a nuclear state, or is 
fabricated by a terrorist group using illegally obtained fissile nuclear material.  The 
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nuclear explosion from an IND releases intense amounts of energy through shockwaves, 
heat, prompt radiation emission, and radioactive fission fragments (also known as 
radioactive fallout).  INDs are not the focus of this research, as they present unique 
challenges for detecting, but it is important to understand the differences between INDs, 
REDs, and RDDs. REDs utilize highly radioactive materials to irradiate some arbitrary 
area without physically disbursing the radioisotopes [17].  An example of a RED is a 
gamma ray source, such as Cobalt-60, that is taped to the underside of a public bus seat.  
This would expose all passengers within a certain area with potentially harmful doses of 
gamma radiation while remaining inconspicuous.  RDDs also utilize highly radioactive 
materials, but actively disburse them using delivery systems such as explosives, 
pressurized containers, fans, sprayers, crop dusters, or building ventilation systems.  
Compared to REDs, RDDs can potentially contaminate very large areas with extremely 
small pieces of radioactive material [17].  The resultant cleanup and decontamination are 
a serious and challenging problem for emergency first responders, which stresses the 
importance of detecting and locating illicit source material before a WMD can be 
constructed and employed.   
Gamma Interactions 
In order to locate and identify gamma photons from the radioisotopes discussed 
previously, we need to understand how they will interact with materials in the 
environment as well as our detectors.  There are two primary mechanisms by which this 
occurs; photoelectric absorption (PE) and Compton scattering (CS).  In PE absorption, a 
gamma photon is absorbed by an atomic electron that is then ejected from one of the 
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atom’s electron shells.  This electron then deposits its energy in the material; if this 
interaction occurs in a radiation detector, it can produce a signal (voltage, current, etc.) 
that is proportional to the energy of the incident photon.  Similarly, CS occurs when a 
gamma ray collides with an atomic electron; in this event, the gamma ray transfers a 
portion of its energy to the electron and scatters in a different direction from its incident 
trajectory.  As with a PE electron, the recoiled electron will traverse the material where 
the interaction occurred and deposit its energy, possibly producing an output signal in our 
radiation detector [14].  
Gamma Spectroscopy 
Once the gamma photons interact with our detector and produce measurable 
signals, a histogram can be produced that correlates said signals to incident gamma 
energies.  The measured gamma energies are grouped into energy bins, typically 
quantified in kiloelectron volts (keV).  The height of an energy bin represents the number 
of counted interactions that correspond to the energy bin.  Across the measured energy 
spectrum, the histogram of energy bins and corresponding counts represents a wave-
shaped line called a pulse height spectrum.  The clarity of a pulse height spectrum varies 
and is characterized by the detector resolution, which is a measure of the detector’s 
ability to differentiate the signals produced by gamma interactions.  The full width at half 
maximum (FWHM) is the width of the gamma ray peak at half of the highest point on the 
peak distribution.  Detector resolution is the FWHM divided by the energy of this peak 
gamma ray and is conventionally expressed as a percentage.  The lower the detector 
resolution percentage, the more defined a spectral line is, resulting in a higher likelihood 
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to identify radioisotopes.  Detector resolution is affected by the detector technology, the 
algorithms associated with the detector software, and varies with the energy of the 
incident gamma ray [14].  An example pulse height spectrum delineated into energy bins 
and counted events is shown in Figure 1.  It is important to understand how a detector’s 
resolution impacts the accuracy of identifying the radioisotopes that are present.   
 
 
Figure 1.  Voltage pulses collected into energy bins [18] 
High-resolution (low percentage) detectors are more likely to differentiate between 
measured energy bins, allowing a more accurate assessment of which isotopes may be 
present.  Low-resolution (high percentage) detectors may struggle to differentiate gamma 
photons that have similar energies, as they may be lumped together into a single energy 
bin.  The precision of different detector technologies can be seen in Table 2.  Energy 
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resolutions of different radionuclide identification devices (RID) gamma ray detector 
types and Figure 2.   
Table 2.  Energy resolutions of different radionuclide identification devices (RID) 
gamma ray detector types [19] 
Detector Type Resolution at 662 keV 
Thallium-doped Sodium Iodide (NaI(Tl)) 6 - 8% 
Lanthanum Bromide (LaBr₃) 2 - 4% 
Cadmium Zinc Telluride (CZT) 1 - 2% 
High Purity Germanium (HPGe) < 0.2% 
 
 
Figure 2.  Barium-133 gamma ray spectra acquired with various RIDs [19] 
Low-resolution detector materials, such as NaI, can lead to energy measurements blurring 
together into one energy peak, which does not accurately represent the energy spectrum 
and can lead to the misidentification of a radioisotope or a false negative.  This blurring 
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of NaI spectra can be seen in Figure 2 in the 300 keV to 400 keV range when compared 
to the other detector technologies.  Furthermore, to attain the resolution of 7% listed in 
Table 2, the NaI detector measurement has a FWHM of about 47 keV from a 662 keV 
incident gamma ray.  On the other hand, high-resolution detectors (e.g. high purity 
germanium) can differentiate between gamma energies that are within a few keV of each 
other [19].  In order to achieve a resolution of 0.2% listed in Table 2, the HPGe detector 
measurement has a FWHM of about 1.5 keV at 662 keV.   
Detection Efficiency 
A competing characteristic to detector resolution is efficiency; there are two 
components that make up detection efficiency, geometric and intrinsic.  The geometric 
efficiency is determined primarily by a detector’s distance from the radiation source and, 
to a lesser degree, the size of the detector.  If we make the reasonable assumption that our 
gamma source is emitting photons isotropically, and that the size of the detector is small 
compared to the distance between it and the source, the fraction of emitted photons that 
will reach the detector (𝜀𝐺) is inversely proportional to the square of the separation 
distance (𝑟2) (Equation 1) [14]. 
𝜺𝑮 ∝  
𝟏
𝒓𝟐
        (1) 
If there is little to no material for the gammas to interact with between the source and the 
detector, this relationship can inform operational parameters such as standoff distance 
and loiter time. 
 
17 
In contrast, intrinsic efficiency is a function of the detector itself, and is 
determined by the interaction material, its volume, and the energy of the incident photon. 
Dense materials, such as scintillators and semiconductors discussed later, have a higher 
concentration of electrons per volume for photons to interact with compared to gaseous 
material. All other parameters being equal, e.g. charge collection or conversion 
efficiency, a detector with a low-density material will need a larger volume than one with 
a higher density, affecting operational parameters such as vehicle size and carry capacity 
[14], [18]. 
Gamma Attenuation 
Gamma attenuation is when a certain quantity of gamma rays passes through an 
intervening material.  This is due to the previously mentioned PE and CS interactions that 
occur.  Attenuation can have a large effect on the amount and strength of gamma energies 
incident on a detector volume. When intervening material is present, the quantity of 
incident gamma rays is decreased and Equation 1 no longer applies; such intervening 
material, such as building walls or radiation shielding, would require a detector to be 
closer for detection and identification. 
Gas-Filled Detectors 
Gas-filled detectors operate when incident radiation interacts with fill gas to 
create ionizations.  Using an applied voltage across a cathode and anode, ions are 
collected to create an electrical signal in the form of a current or pulse [20].  Gas-filled 
detector volumes are typically sealed and pressurized in order to preserve the 
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performance of the fill gas [21].  The output signal of a gas-filled detector is dependent 
on the voltage applied, which is pictured in Figure 3.  The higher the applied voltage, the 
higher the output signal.  Gas-filled detectors for radiation surveying are typically 
operated in three regions:  ionization, proportional, and Geiger-Müller (G-M).  Due to the 
low voltage of the ionization region, there is no amplification of the number of ions 
created by incident radiation, resulting in a detector measurement that is directly 
proportional to the number of original ion pairs created.  The proportional region has a 
higher-applied voltage and operates similarly to the ionization region, except that the 
original ion pairs are amplified, creating more ionizations in the detector volume.  The 
measurement of the resulting pulse is proportional to the number of original ion pairs 
formed.  The G-M region has the highest usable operating voltage.  This significant 
voltage difference leads to an avalanche effect following gamma interactions, increasing 
the produced ions by up to one million-fold throughout the entire detector volume [22]. 
Gas is not dense and has a low probability for interaction with incident radiation.  
Therefore, a larger gas-filled volume increases the probability for interaction. 
Additionally, operating gas-filled detectors in the G-M region increases the potential for 
ion pairs to be attracted to the charged electrodes, making it ideal for large area searches. 
Operation in this region gives the most sensitive detection capability but requires the 




Figure 3.  Gas-filled detector six region curve for gamma interactions [22] 
The extra batteries, along with the necessity to increase detector volume, increases weight 
and space requirements and adds heat to the system.  A negative aspect of gas-filled 
detectors is the inability to differentiate between different radiation energies.  However, 
this is a capability that scintillators and semiconductors possess. 
Scintillation Detectors 
Scintillation is when radiation interacts with certain detector media and produces 
visual light.  Scintillators can be organic or inorganic and can be a liquid, solid, or gas, 
but solid materials are the most common for detectors.  They are typically encased in 
reflective materials to provide extra rigidity, waterproofing, and to prevent luminesced 
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light from escaping [20].  A photomultiplier tube or photodiode converts the light into an 
electrical pulse that can be interpreted by detector software [14].   
Each scintillation material has different inherent properties that need to be 
considered for detector selection, such as hygroscopicity, decay time, and sensitivity to 
shock.  Some materials degrade if exposed to water, even water vapor in ambient air, so 
airtight chambers are required for certain scintillators.  Additionally, scintillators are 
typically dense crystals that require photomultiplier tubes to convert light into meaningful 
data.  This adds weight and space requirements that need to be considered for UV 
application.  However, scintillators require significantly lower applied potential 
compared to gas-filled detectors, so a separate power supply is not necessary for 
operation. Vibrations can also be of concern for some scintillating materials.  Depending 
on the scintillator, vibrations can induce counts in the materials and can damage brittle 
crystals, which could produce false positives and unreliable data if using for search 
operations [3], [23]. 
Plastic scintillators are low-cost, robust, and can be made very large. However, 
the detectors lack resolution and are ineffective for identification of a radioisotope. 
NaI scintillators are very common and have been employed for decades.  NaI crystals can 
be made large (in excess of 10 centimeters x 10 centimeters x 46 centimeters) but are 
considerably more expensive than plastic scintillators. The advantage of sodium iodide is 
that it can be applied to both initial search and identification of source material.  
Handheld versions may be undersized for UV purposes, but a larger crystal could give 
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better detection efficiency while maintaining spectroscopic abilities for isotope 
identification [4]. 
Semiconductor Detectors 
 Semiconductor detectors do not luminesce when interacting with gamma rays.  
The process is similar to gas-filled detectors, which measure resulting ionizations from 
radiation interactions over a voltage difference [14].  However, semiconductor detectors 
differ from scintillators and gas-filled detectors in that they directly measure excited 
electrons, which produces much better energy resolution [22].  HPGe detectors are 
commonly used for the detection and identification of radioisotopes due to their excellent 
resolution. The disadvantages of these systems are that they must be cryogenically cooled 
with liquid nitrogen or an electromechanical Stirling-cycle cooler, resulting in a very 
heavy instrument.  Additionally, HPGe detectors are significantly more expensive than 
scintillators. An example system is the Ortec Micro-Detective. This is a 15-pound (6.8-
kilogram) handheld detector that utilizes an electromechanically cooled HPGe crystal.  It 
is capable of producing a resolution of less than one percent and can operate for 5 hours 
on a rechargeable Lithium-ion battery. However, the detector performance can be 
affected by vibration and heat [4]. 
Multirotor Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
 Current commercially available multirotor systems use either electric power 
plants using lithium polymer batteries or hybrid-electric systems that utilize gas engines 
as generators to produce power for electrically driven motors.  Electrically driven 
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systems have limited operational flight times due to the low energy density of battery 
technology.  Electric multirotor systems with sensors other than small cameras are 
typically limited to 30-minute duration flights, which is not ideal for conducting 
radiological search operations.  On the other hand, hybrid-electric systems have had 
success in more robust and longer duration applications due to the higher energy density 
that gasoline provides as an energy source [24].  Gasoline-powered generators allow 
hybrid-electric multirotor vehicles to fly much longer and farther than their all-electric 
counterparts.  Commercially available hybrid-electric systems currently on the market list 
specifications that are vast improvements upon battery powered systems.  Claims of 5-
hour flight duration, payloads as heavy as 12 pounds (5.5 kilograms), and a range of 110 
miles (177 kilometers) are a few examples from Skyfront’s Perimeter-8 model [25].  The 
longer duration, range, and heavier payload capabilities make multirotor systems much 
more attractive and applicable to arenas such as emergency response and military 
operations [24].  However, gasoline engines present unique design and operating issues 
that do not affect battery-powered systems, such as mechanical noise, combustion noise, 
engine start-up, generator maintenance, exhaust, cooling, and vibrations.  These 
additional side effects of a hybrid-electric power plant could affect the overall 
performance of the system and the feasibility of deploying and operating in constrained 
environments.   
Fixed-wing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
 The purpose of a fixed-wing vehicle within this system would be to cover a large 
area during initial the search for radiological material.  In order to increase the likelihood 
 
23 
for successful detection, the vehicle should operate at lower altitudes to have the highest 
probability of radiation interaction with the on-board radiological detection system.   
Additionally, time over target is also an issue due to detector hardware and software 
delays.  A fast platform may not detect radiological material during overflight compared 
to a slower moving platform.  Therefore, a balance between speed and endurance must be 
managed in order to adequately meet desired performance outcomes.  Fixed-wing 
platforms have been around longer than multirotor systems and can vary greatly in size 
and in the type of power plant.   Hand-thrown battery-powered platforms have been 
operated in many restrictive and rural environments but are limited by the payload weight 
and area that can be covered.  Incorporating liquid fuel engines to drive single propellers 
has proven successful for platforms over 20 pounds (9.1 kilograms).  An example of 
small UAS capabilities is the UAV Factory Penguin series.  It is available as a battery-
powered system or with an electronic fuel-injected engine, with claims such as endurance 
from 110 minutes to 20 hours, range of up to 60 miles (97 kilometers), and a payload 
upwards of 22 pounds (10 kilograms).  Early models of the system have been flown since 
2009 and are utilized in more than 43 countries [26].  
Unmanned Ground Vehicles 
 Unmanned ground vehicles were some of the earliest operated unmanned mobile 
systems.  They were utilized as early as 1981 during the Chernobyl nuclear reactor 
meltdown in the attempt to limit exposure to responding personnel [2].  Many variants 
and sizes are currently operated by federal and local governments across the United 
States and internationally.  Ground vehicles have the advantage of being able to loiter in 
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an area for long periods of time and also carry the heaviest payloads compared to aerial 
vehicles.  However, ground vehicles are limited in range and can be disabled by rough 



















III.  Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the methods used for analyzing multiple 
focus areas of the radiological search mission. The resulting research will culminate in 
characterizing the trade-space for the unmanned vehicle system.  Methods to be used 
include a concept of operations, a system decomposition, and a feasibility analysis of 
utilizing the system for radiological search operations and other mission areas.  The flow 
of this research will resemble the highlighted portion of the systems engineering “V”, 
which is depicted on the left side of Figure 4.   
 
Figure 4.  Systems engineering “V” for system development [27] 
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A CONOPS for the system will be established with corresponding measures of 
effectiveness (MOEs) at the mission level.  The CONOPS is not linked to user 
requirements, but rather a hypothetical approach to unmanned vehicles for completing 
radiological search missions currently accomplished with human operators.  Use cases 
will be derived from the CONOPS, as well as resulting tasks, attributes and measures of 
performance (MOPs).  A system decomposition of the functional system architecture 
with functional tasks and a physical hierarchy will be derived in order to allocate system 
functions to componentry.  The approaches to these methods will be further discussed 
below. 
Concept of Operations 
 An assessment of radiological search operations will be conducted in order to 
determine the realistic operational umbrella that an unmanned system could be deployed 
in support of.  Understanding the limitations of the mission space that the system is 
applicable to will also apply to the derivation of the system’s architectural makeup as 
well as potential architecture modifications needed to make the system useful in other 
mission areas.  Within the overarching mission of performing radiological search, it is 
important to understand what limitations there are by introducing unmanned platforms 
and what information needs to be collected and delivered by an unmanned system.  A 
CONOPS will be established which will detail mission needs, limitations, capabilities, 
and scenarios appropriate to the system.  Additionally, it will include the tasks, attributes, 
and measures of the conceptualized system [28]. 
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 The CONOPS will also include a mission timeframe, operational needs, system 
limitations, enabling capabilities for system operation, and valid scenarios for system 
employment.   The system CONOPS will frame the mission set that it can be deployed in 
support of.  An example CONOPS from the 2019 AFIT UAS three-course design and 
testing series will be used as a baseline for this research.  In addition, some imposed 
design requirements of the system will be presumed and discussed in terms of their 
functionality to the mission and why they are important for operational use. 
Mission needs will provide information about expected capabilities the system 
should have to perform the radiological search mission.  These can be made for both 
friendly and adversarial conditions and will be logical, realistic, and necessary for 
continuing the conceptualization process.  Unrealistic assumptions will be avoided, with 
the focus being placed on gaps in knowledge that are important for successful planning 
and characterization of the system.  Operational limitations can be physical in nature or 
be due to self-imposed policy that restricts operational functionality.  Policy can be 
leadership driven, multinational, or economic based.  Operational constraints can be 
imposed in the form of rules of engagement, which can vary between commands, 
organizations, and political boundaries.  Policy concerns will not be discussed in this 
research, with the focus being placed on physical operational limitations of the various 
subsystems of the unmanned system.  Environmental and scenario-specific constraints 
will be addressed as part of the physical limitations.   
 Lastly, scenario examples will be provided in order to understand the range of 
missions that the conceptualized system can cover.  These scenarios define friendly and 
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adversarial conditions, enabling capabilities for system functionality, and the expected 
value toward mission completion.  The scenarios used in this research are not all-
encompassing of the system’s abilities but provide context to the potential utility of the 
system.   
System Decomposition 
Using the CONOPS, a decomposition of the system will be derived.  The 
decomposition will consist of a use case model for the system, a functional 
decomposition, and an allocation of system functions to physical componentry.  The 
CONOPS will drive the contents of the functional decomposition.  The CONOPS will 
have traceability to the functional decomposition and the physical architecture of each 
system module.  At the basic level, physical componentry of the various systems will be 
linked to performing all tasks associated with completing the radiological search mission.   
The functional decomposition and allocation will be completed using Cameo 
System Modeler 19.0, which is a model-based systems engineering software tool that 
uses Systems Modeling Language (SysML) to develop systems engineering solutions 
[29].  As a starting point for the functional decomposition and allocation, a reference 
architecture will be used and expanded upon.  The reference architecture (RA) was 
developed by several AFIT professors associated with the small unmanned aerial system 
courses [30]. The RA is organized by four top-level packages, which comprise a 
component library, a basic multirotor system, a basic ground control station (GCS), and 
an example system concept integrating the GCS and fixed-wing UV.  Components within 
each package are further broken down into value properties and ports that characterize 
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the component, such as memory capacity, operating system type, radio frequency, and 
cost.  The properties are customizable for the user’s desired specificity, but not 
comprehensive of everything that may need to be measured.  Additional properties can be 
added to the concept system’s componentry blocks as needed.  Lastly, the RA provides 
an example of a decomposed CONOPS for a remote targeting system with a use case 
model and the associated activity diagrams.  The user of the RA is responsible for 
developing a use case model and functional tasks that meet the requirements for the 
pertinent CONOPS with traceability to physical componentry, which is the end state of 
the system decomposition for this research.   
Using the established use cases, tasks, attributes, measures, as well as MOEs, 
MOPs, and performance factors will be derived that exemplify mission execution of the 
use cases [31].  Mission-level tasks that feed into mission execution will be identified 
along with important attributes that are valuable and feasible to measure.  These tasks, 
attributes, and measures are evaluating the mission space from an agnostic perspective, 
pertaining to both human and system execution.  An MOE is a measure of how well an 
operational task or set of tasks is executed within its expected operational environment.  
MOEs will be established that pertain to the radiological search mission and the expected 
operating environmental conditions yet are mission-based and not system-specific [32].  
MOPs are a refinement of MOEs and provide measurable performance factors that help 
evaluate an MOE’s status.  The attributes will coincide with MOPs and the attributes’ 
measures will be analogous to listed performance parameters.  The list will not be 
exhaustive of all potential MOEs, MOPs, and performance parameters, but will highlight 
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key factors that characterize the system’s effectiveness at completing the radiological 
search mission.    
Analysis of Feasibility and Utility 
 The last segment of this research is to evaluate the feasibility of incorporating the 
system into radiological search operations.  The spectrum of mission operations will be 
considered, to include execution of the entire operation with an unmanned system, 
incorporating the system into a portion of operations, or not utilizing the system for 
radiological search missions. However, the focus of the feasibility discussion will be the 
scenarios identified in the CONOPS.  As part of the feasibility analysis, estimates of 
vehicle endurance will be determined corresponding to vehicle size, battery and fuel 
capacity, and payload size.  Furthermore, the system’s utility to other mission areas will 
be assessed, along with the necessary system architecture modifications to expand its 












IV.  Analysis and Results 
Chapter Overview 
 From the methodology presented in Chapter III, the analysis of the radiological 
search system will be approached from an academic yet practical perspective. 
Characterizing the system, its capabilities, and the physical framework to meet those 
capabilities are beneficial for gaining an accurate sight picture of the conceptualized 
system.  However, the academic approach will culminate with the feasibility analysis of 
the system by realistically considering the potential benefits and possible drawbacks that 
this system could present to gaining units and agencies for the radiological search 
mission and other mission areas.  New technological capabilities are not always viable to 
replace or supplement current tactics, techniques, and procedures, which will be 
discussed at the end of this chapter.  
Concept of Operations 
This CONOPS defines a prototype system and the associated efforts to assess 
system architecture and demonstrate the feasibility and utility of a concept solution 
before a prototype demonstration phase.  The CONOPS, and the proposed system 
framework solutions associated with it, address the system’s vehicles, sensors, user 
interface software, communication system, support functions, and operator actions for 




This CONOPS is intended to be an enabling concept and is written at the tactical 
level.  More specifically, the radiological search CONOPS describes the projected 
utilization by Department of Defense (DoD) CBRN personnel, explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD) technicians, and special operations forces (SOF), as well as analogous 
federal, state, and local entities necessitating the capability to detect, locate and confirm 
the existence of hazardous radiological material.  The radiological sources will be in one 
of two categories:  an orphan source where the material is lost or stolen or when the 
material has already been weaponized into an RDD or RED.  
Mission Timeframe 
 Mission timeframe refers to the expected time it will take to research, develop, 
acquire, test, and deploy the objective system to operational units.  The intent for the 
system’s research and development phase is to utilize commercial off the shelf (COTS) 
and government off the shelf (GOTS) technologies to reduce initial startup time typically 
seen for newly developed systems.  Applying previously researched and tested equipment 
to system construction will expedite this portion of the process.  It will also shorten the 
time required to develop training programs and support equipment required to field the 
system.  The mission timeframe is expected to be between two and five years.  Two years 
is a best-case estimate to allow for research, acquisition, testing of the separate 
components, and assembling them into an operative system of systems. This also includes 
the procurement of support equipment and the development and execution of training for 
system operation and maintenance.  The system should be completed and fielded within 
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five years due to the rapid pace of innovation in the unmanned vehicle industry.  A 
system under development for a longer period of time will be outpaced and become 
obsolete prior to becoming operationally fielded. 
Mission Needs  
The system will deploy to meet intelligence-based missions as required or to aid 
in the search and recovery of lost, stolen, or other forms of radiological source material.   
The system under consideration should be small in size but capable of searching an area 
of 3 square kilometers or larger, to include, but not be limited to, large urban buildings 
and sea-based vessels.  The system is to be used by tactically deployable units from 
federal, state, and local organizations, so logistical requirements should be moderately 
small in size.  The system should function with no more than four human operators and 
should be deployable utilizing no more than a transport vehicle and trailer for 
transportation.  The objective system should be easily maintainable and should integrate 
as many COTS and GOTS components as possible.  Garrison maintenance equipment 
capabilities and battery charging units are within the scope of the objective system.  This 
does not include commonly found tools such as wrenches and screw drivers.  While the 
unmanned vehicles are intended to be reusable, the cost of the systems should be 
sufficiently low to allow disposal in lieu of costly decontamination, hazardous recovery, 
and vehicle loss or theft.  Due to the potential operation in contested areas, loss or theft of 
system vehicles should not provide substantial exploitable information or materiel to 
adversarial forces.  
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The baseline system shall contain a combination of air vehicles, a ground vehicle, 
and a ground control station for user interface.  Using the system of vehicles equipped 
with various and interchangeable payloads, the system will be able to locate and confirm 
the existence of radiological source material, as well as generate a three-dimensional 
radiation dose rate contour map of the search area.  Due to the continuous improvement 
of technology in unmanned vehicles and radiation detection equipment, the system shall 
employ a modular, open system architecture which facilitates the integration of new 
sensors and subsystems throughout its lifecycle.  This includes but is not limited to 
defense programs of record (PORs), COTS and GOTS technologies, and sensors 
associated with other CBRN constituents.  However, the system should make extensive 
use of COTS and GOTS componentry and existing vehicles in order to minimize 
development time and system cost.  The objective system’s air vehicles shall adhere to 
DoD UAS Group 1, Group 2, or small Group 3 weight, altitude, and speed requirements 
for low altitude maneuverability and tactical deployability (Table 3).   
Lastly, the system will allow for semi-autonomous operation with real-time, 
human-in-the-loop control.  Each operational task will require a certain level of human 
input, which necessitates a varying degree of control given to the GCS or on-board 
processor.  The level of autonomy will be driven by the risk of each task and the impact it 
has on mission completion.  The overall level of autonomy is relatively low, with most 
tasks requiring operator input or pre-planned tasks for the system to execute.  
Consequentially, the shared responsibility between a human operator and the system GCS  
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will range from #1 to #4 across the Taxonomy of the Distribution of Responsibility 
between Human and Computer (Figure 5).   
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Figure 5.  Taxonomy of the distribution of responsibility between human and 
computer [34] 
Enabling Capabilities 
Some capabilities fall outside of the radiological search SUVS scope but are 
necessary to enable the system’s effective use.  While the system may make use of on-
board navigation sensors for terrain avoidance, it is anticipated that the system will utilize 
the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) for maneuvering to waypoints, tracking its 
position, and mapping radiation strength of the search area.  Low cost alternative 
navigation (non-GNSS) technologies are emerging but may not be available for 
deployment in the two to five-year window envisioned for this system.  The system 
should be transportable by a light to medium-duty truck with a trailer or a small 
1. Human does all planning, scheduling, optimizing, etc. and turns task over to computer 
merely for deterministic execution.  
2. Computer provides options but the human chooses between them, plans the 
operations, and then turns task over to computer for execution. 
3. Computer helps to determine options, and suggests one for use, which human may or 
may not accept before turning task over to computer for execution. 
4. Computer selects option and plans action, which human may or may not approve, 
computer can reuse options suggested by human.  
5. Computer selects action and carries it out if human approves. 
6. Computer selects options, plans, and actions and displays them in time for human to 
intervene and then carries them out in default if there is no human input. 
7. Computer does entire task and informs human of what it has done. 
8. Computer does entire task and informs human only if requested. 
9. Computer does entire task and informs human if it believes the latter needs to know. 
10. Computer performs entire task autonomously, ignoring the human supervisor who 
must completely trust the computer in all aspects of decision making.  
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waterborne vessel for deploying the system to the operational area of concern. The 
transport vehicle should be capable of powering the GCS and associated GCS-operated 
equipment, as well as charging vehicle batteries when forward deployed.  However, 
external power may be required when forward deployed for multiple missions or long 
durations.     
Scenarios 
The listed scenarios are broad and cover the entirety of mission phases that need 
to be accomplished by the system.  The scenarios not only pertain to the conceptualized 
system, but also entail inherent interactions and inputs from the human operators of the 
system.  The envisioned phases of system operation include ground control setup and 
teardown, vehicle deployment, mission execution, and system recovery. 
Ground Control Setup & Teardown Phase 
This phase encompasses all actions necessary to deploy the SUVS including 
unpacking, inventory, assembly, function checks, mission planning, disassembly, and 
reconstitution.  Since the system is intended for use with forward deployable units, 
transportation of the system must be compatible with deployed vehicles or small 
waterborne vessels.  The system must be capable of operating without externally supplied 
power.  A system built-in-test will signal to the operator if the system is fully operational; 
if the system is not 100% operational, the built-in-test will identify all system faults.  
Mission planning for the system should be practicable prior to deployment, prior to 
beginning operations when on site, and modifiable during on-going operations once 
vehicles have been launched.   
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Vehicle Deployment Phase 
This phase encompasses all actions necessary to achieve initial vehicle movement 
starting from a properly configured vehicle or vehicles and a ground control station.  No 
more than two operators should be required to deploy a vehicle.  Following built-in-tests, 
mission plans should be wirelessly uploaded to involved vehicles prior to launch.  The 
vehicle deployment phase ends once movement toward the target area is achieved and the 
system begins waypoint navigation.  
Mission Phase 
This phase includes a variety of tasks as defined by the selected payloads and 
established mission plan.  It is envisioned that the system will be capable of waypoint 
navigation to both pre-planned and ad-hoc waypoints, can loiter or hover depending on 
the vehicle type, can navigate terrain, and can operate attached sensors at designated 
waypoints per the mission requirements.  Mission tasks that should be accomplished in 
order to meet the desired capabilities of the system include: 
1. Loiter or hover about a waypoint or navigate to a sequence of waypoints 
while providing real-time radiological strength measurements to the 
ground control station.  Video imagery from search should be recorded 
and displayed to the ground control station in real-time. Video options will 
be available for both daytime and low-light conditions, with enough 
quality for the ground control station operator to detect human figures 
based on the displayed imagery.  The operator will designate a target 
search area with the ground control station software and the system will 
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search the designated target area based on vehicle telemetry, with a 
desired accuracy of 15 meters distance root mean squared (DRMS).  The 
initial search should yield calculated location(s) of radiological source 
material based upon maximum radiation readings and telemetry data.  The 
system should be capable of displaying a radiological strength contour 
map of the target area to the ground control station operator.   
2. Navigate to a waypoint and hover, land, or dwell at the location while 
providing real-time video imagery to the ground control station.  Video 
imagery should be recorded and displayed to the ground control station in 
real-time. The operator will designate the target location(s) calculated 
from the initial area search.   Once at a designated target location, the 
system will confirm the detected radiological sources by collecting a 
gamma spectrum of the source material.  Spectrum data will be provided 
to the ground control station and the system will predict the radioisotopes 
based off the measured gamma energies. 
3.  Traverse the exterior wall faces of an urban structure, covering both the 
horizontal and vertical extent of a building.  The system should employ 
terrain avoidance while maintaining a safe distance from a structure in 
order to avoid damage to or loss of a vehicle.  The desired location 
accuracy of 15 meters DRMS is driven by the need to avoid collateral 
damage in urban environments.  While traversing the exterior wall faces of 
a building, the system will record radiation strength measurements at 
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locations adjacent to the walls.  These radiation measurements will be 
used to develop a three-dimensional contour map to pinpoint probable 
locations for the source material.  
4. Perform a commanded ditch or crash maneuver in the event of system 
faults or circumstances making recovery impossible or undesirable, such 
as unavoidable contact with hostile personnel or compromise of the 
system.  Each system vehicle will encompass a self-destruct module to 
make the system unusable if seized by unfriendly forces.  
5. Perform a return to launch (RTL) at any time during operation.  An RTL 
will return the vehicle to a pre-programmed location where it will perform 
the recovery phase. 
Recovery Phase 
This phase involves recovering the vehicles upon completion of the mission or as 
deemed necessary.  The UVs should be capable of navigating to a recovery location 
designated by the ground control station operator.  Unassisted takeoff and landing of air 
vehicles are desirable if done safely and to ensure rapid recovery and reuse of the vehicle.  
Batteries must be replaceable in the field and additional fuel should be available for 
sequential search or continuing large area search or surveillance operations.   
System Decomposition 
Use Cases 
A use case model for the system has been developed using Cameo Systems 
Modeler to visualize the main operational functions that the system needs to perform, as 
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well as the interactions the system has with actors, external systems, and the environment 
(Figure 6).  The use cases are based on mission needs, enabling capabilities, and 
scenarios previously mentioned. The entire system is responsible for performing setup, 
planning the mission, deploying and ingress, performing search and confirmation 
activities, egressing and recovery, and self-destruction if necessary.  Several use cases 
require interactions with the GNSS, the physical environment, and human operators, 
 
Figure 6.  Use case model for the radiological search system 
whereas the target radiological source material only relates to performing search and 
confirmation.  The use cases holistically provide the necessary functions to execute the 
entire spectrum of the radiological search mission, as determined by the CONOPS.  The 
details of the individual use cases can be found in Appendix B.   
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Tasks, Attributes, and Measures 
Within the confines of the radiological search mission, there are basic tasks that 
must be accomplished as part of mission execution.  The tasks, along with the associated 
attributes and measures, can be seen in Table 4.  This list highlights important variables  
Table 4.  Mission-level key tasks, attributes, and measures 
Task Attribute Measure 
Search Coverage 
Duration [min] 
Total area searched [m²] 
Area coverage rate [m²/s] 
Detect Accurate 
Probability of detection [%] 
False alarm rate [alarms/mission] 
Navigate Accurate 
DRMS absolute location error [m] 
DRMS relative location error [m] 
Communicate 
Secure Encrypted/not encrypted 
Range Range [m] 
Confirm 
Spectral resolution Resolution [% FWHM] 
Source position accuracy DRMS location error [m] 
Mission-wide 
Workload Minimum crew size required [# personnel] 
Availability 
Mission turn time [min] 
Mission ready rate [% mission capable] 
 
that apply to the mission.  The tasks are essential for executing the individual use cases, 
and therefore meeting the intent established in the CONOPS.  The attributes and 
measures capture what can be considered significant measurable data for task evaluation 
if system development were to occur.  It should be noted that the list does not encompass 
all tasks that need to be performed nor all measures that should be considered for 
evaluation.  Additionally, there are some attributes and measures that apply across all 
mission tasks, which are combined in a “mission-wide” task category.  The major tasks 
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for mission completion are search, detection, navigation, communication, and 
confirmation. The established mission-level tasks feed MOEs for the radiological search 
mission and the expected operating environmental conditions [32].  From there, system-
specific MOPs were developed including measurable performance factors for evaluating 
the MOEs.  The MOPs are related to the task attributes and the attributes’ measures 
correspond to performance parameters.  The list of developed MOEs, MOPs, and 
performance parameters are in Table 5.  As mentioned previously, the MOEs, MOPs, and 
performance parameters are not exhaustive and provide an academic assessment of 
critical data that should be measured to assess system performance against mission 
execution. 
Table 5.  MOEs with system-specific MOPs and performance parameters 
MOE  MOP Performance Parameters 
Success rate of locating 
and identifying 
radiological source 
material in a 3 square 
kilometer search area 
Location accuracy of 
radiological source(s) 
Detector dead time [ms] 
Detector dose rate range [mSv] 
DRMS relative location error [m] 
DRMS absolute location error [m] 
Confirmation accuracy of 
radiological isotope(s) 
Spectrum resolution [%] 
Minimum energy detected [keV] 
Maximum energy detected [keV] 
Endurance 
Weight [kg] 
Power capacity [W] 
Area coverage rate 
Camera FOV [°] 
Operating altitude [m] 
Vehicle cruise speed [m/s] 
Degree of autonomy Autonomy scale [Figure 5] 
Video imagery resolution Ground sample distance [m] 
Ability to communicate 
data to a remote-
control point across a 
3-kilometer distance 
Data processing speed 
GCS processing speed [GHz] 
Data transmission rate [Mbps] 
Data encryption  Y/N 
Transmission range 
 
Tx power [dB] 




Functional Decomposition and Physical Allocation 
Continuing with the system hierarchy, the functional decomposition and 
allocation of physical componentry can be produced.  For the purposes of this research, 
the CONOPS identified system requirements are based on assumptions and personal 
knowledge of the radiological search mission space.  This is unlike traditional processes 
where requirements are identified by operational users of a conceptualized system [28].  
The requirements as presented herein are traceable to the use cases, tasks, attributes, 
measures, and now to the functional decomposition and physical architecture of the 
system.  Individual tasks are essential for the completion of the different scenarios 
mentioned in the CONOPS as well as for the execution of each use case.  A 
conglomeration of all derived tasks for a vehicle and the GCS can be seen in Table 6.   
Table 6.  Derived system tasks between vehicle and GCS 
Vehicle Activities GCS Activities 
Auto land Load MP Analyze spectrum data Display video 
Auto takeoff Loiter Calculate target coord Receive MP status 
Capture video Navigate waypoints Combine rad data/telemetry Receive rad data 
Collect rad data Send rad data Connect to vehicle Receive spectrum data 
Collect rad spectrum Send spectrum data Construct MP Receive telemetry 
Conduct BIT Send telemetry Create rad map Send cmd 
Follow search pattern Send video Display rad data Store rad data 
Initiate search Trigger self-destruct Display rad map Store spectrum data 
  Display rad spectrum Store target coord 
  Display radionuclide Store telemetry 
  Display target coord Store video 
  Display telemetry Write MP 
The functional decomposition has been split at the system level into vehicle activities and 
GCS activities, represented in the MBSE format in Figure 7.  For this research, the 




Figure 7.  System functional decomposition 
and multirotor UVs.  The activities for the various vehicles are broken down into 
performing controlled movement, autopilot function, vehicle data communications, 
radiation measurement, and providing video (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8.  Generic vehicle functional decomposition 
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For the ground control station, the functional decomposition is categorized by processing, 
providing data communication with system vehicles, providing interface and output for 
the GCS operator, and receiving video from vehicles.  The GCS sends commands to 
system vehicles, receives and displays video, and receives, processes, and displays 
critical flight and radiation measurement data (Figure 9).
 
Figure 9.  GCS functional decomposition 
 
47 
The physical architecture consists of singular components, organized into system 
modules, that fulfill the execution of tasks listed in the vehicle and GCS functional 
decompositions (Figure 10-13).  The vehicle modules are navigation, payload, power, 
self-destruct, and the vehicle itself.  The subsystem breakdowns are not exhaustive lists  
 
 
Figure 10.  Multirotor physical architecture 
 
 




Figure 12.  Ground vehicle physical architecture 
 
 
Figure 13.  Ground control station physical architecture 
of all physical hardware but include major components that should be considered for 
future design and sizing.  It should be noted that the power modules for the multirotor 
and fixed-wing vehicles contain both batteries and gasoline-based engines, which will be 
discussed later in Chapter IV.  Additionally, there is no power system listed for the 
ground control station, as this will be powered by the transport vehicle used to deploy the 
system and human operators. 
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From the different physical architectures, the subsystem components can be 
allocated against all system tasks from the functional decomposition.  Allocating each 
individual task against each component within the system continues the traceability from 
the CONOPS, to the use cases, to the tasks, and lastly to the physical hierarchy of the 
system.  An allocation of each activity to a subsystem component satisfies this 
traceability (Table 7).  Each activity that is necessary for mission completion is being 
satisfied by at least one component or one subsystem module.  The individual vehicle and 
GCS physical allocation matrices can be found at Appendix A.  By categorizing the 
subsystems, the physical components, and the executable tasks, a simplified analysis for 











































































Analyze spectrum data ↗
Auto land ↗ ↗ ↗
Auto takeoff ↗ ↗ ↗
Calculate target coord ↗
Capture video ↗ ↗ ↗
Collect rad data ↗ ↗ ↗
Collect rad spectrum ↗ ↗
Combine rad data/telemetry ↗
Conduct BIT ↗ ↗ ↗
Connect to GCS ↗ ↗ ↗
Connect to vehicle ↗
Construct MP ↗
Create rad map ↗
Display MP status ↗
Display rad data ↗
Display rad map ↗
Display rad spectrum ↗
Display radionuclide ↗
Display target coord ↗
Display telemetry ↗
Display video ↗
Follow search pattern ↗ ↗ ↗
Initiate search ↗
Load MP ↗ ↗ ↗
Loiter ↗ ↗ ↗
Navigate waypoints ↗ ↗ ↗
Perform autopilot functions ↗ ↗ ↗
Perform controlled movement ↗ ↗ ↗



































































Perform GCS activities ↗
Perform rad measurement ↗ ↗ ↗
Perform rad search activities ↗ ↗ ↗
Perform vehicle activities ↗ ↗ ↗
Perform vehicle data comm ↗ ↗ ↗
Process ↗
Provide data comm w/ vehicle ↗
Provide I/O w/ GCS operator ↗
Provide video ↗ ↗ ↗
Receive cmd ↗ ↗ ↗
Receive MP status ↗
Receive rad data ↗
Receive spectrum data ↗
Receive telemetry ↗
Receive video ↗
Report MP load status ↗ ↗ ↗
Send cmd ↗
Send rad data ↗ ↗ ↗
Send spectrum data ↗ ↗
Send telemetry ↗ ↗ ↗
Send video ↗ ↗ ↗
Store rad data ↗
Store spectrum data ↗
Store target coord ↗
Store telemetry ↗
Store video ↗





There are several avenues for system design based on the established CONOPS 
and system decomposition.  These include similar and dissimilar componentry as well as 
factors that could attribute to certain design decisions such as payload type, processing 
capabilities, and the operating environment.  In order to evaluate the system 
componentry, the three vehicle systems and the ground control station were assessed.  A 
comparison of subsystem components and their equivalent to other systems is shown in 
Table 8, identifying hardware that can use similar components, hardware that is similar 
but likely use different components, and hardware that is dissimilar. 
Similar Componentry 
After a rudimentary comparison, it is evident that there are multiple overlapping 
components in the payload, navigation, and power modules, as well as the self-destruct 
package. Due to the assumed simplicity of the system concept and maximizing existing 
COTS and GOTS hardware, equivalent components should be selected in order to 
duplicate the capability of each component within the overarching system.  This creates 
redundancy throughout the system, enabling the cannibalization of one vehicle system in 
order to make another system fully operational.  For instance, similar modem components 
should be incorporated for transmitting telemetry data, payload data, and video stream.   
Redundant hardware facilitates the interchange of system components with little to no re-
programming if operational constraints arise.  This can be crucial to operators if they are 
limited on spare parts or if geographically separated from the main operating location by 
providing the ability to troubleshoot a subsystem when hardware becomes inoperable.   
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Table 8.  Comparison analysis of subsystem componentry 
 







































































Similar component, could be same
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The decision to swap components from one system to another is driven by mission and 
scenario need.  For example, intelligence identifies a single building as the target location 
for a radiological source. This would not require the use of a fixed-wing UV since a large 
area search is not needed.  The components of the fixed-wing UV can be cannibalized in 
order to ensure mission execution with the other two system vehicles.  On the contrary, a 
large area search requires a fixed-wing UV for initial detection of the radiological 
material.  However, the fixed-wing UV can be disassembled after initial detection is 
complete, the search area has been narrowed, and when follow-on search and 
identification can be managed by the multirotor or ground vehicle.  Hardware redundancy 
provides the flexibility to prioritize and execute mission needs when necessary.   
Hardware Variations 
There are also multiple componentry differences amongst the vehicle systems and 
the ground control station.  Modules with major variations from other systems include 
power production, the ground control station, and the vehicle itself.  As is anticipated, the 
vehicle chassis will be dissimilar for the various UVs.  This includes the vehicle 
propulsion system, which consists of the motors (electric and gasoline-fueled), servos, 
propellers, and wheel tracks.  The last distinctive vehicle component is an articulator arm 
on the ground vehicle, which can be used for object manipulation and as an extra 
mounting point for vehicle payloads.   
 In order to meet the system’s intent of searching large areas as well as carrying 
payloads in excess of 15 pounds (6.8 kilograms), the power plants for the different 
vehicles cannot be restricted to battery-powered systems.  Other options to be considered 
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include small combustion engines and hybrid-electric motors.  The fixed-wing vehicle is 
required to accomplish an initial search to localize where radiological material is located, 
with the potential to continue operations as a surveillance asset.  Due to the potential for 
long-duration flights, this capability is best supported using a combustion engine in lieu 
of batteries to drive the propeller.  A gasoline engine will enable flight times of several 
hours and increases the required size of the vehicle, which is beneficial for payload 
capacity.  Battery-powered fixed-wing vehicles can achieve flight durations over 1 hour 
but will not be able to carry equivalent payload weights with comparable endurance times 
to gasoline-powered systems.  Comparatively, a battery-powered multirotor system 
would not have the endurance to cover all potential source locations within a 3 square 
kilometer area for collection of a gamma spectrum.  A hybrid-electric system would 
provide greater endurance and offers an increased payload capacity compared to battery-
powered multirotor vehicles.  Battery-powered systems of the desired sizing are typically 
limited to 30-minute flight times, which is insufficient for carrying detector payloads to 
the farthest sites of a large search area.  Additionally, batteries can take 30 minutes to an 
hour for recharging if spare batteries are unavailable, which can hamper the ability to 
execute consecutive sorties.  Endurance estimates supporting the above discussion can be 
found later in Chapter IV.  Opting for fuel-based power systems is ideal for providing 
longer endurance due to a higher energy density compared to battery technology, which 
can be visualized in Figure 14.  Utilizing liquid fuels for the fixed-wing and multirotor 
UVs will increase flight durations, area coverage, and maximum allowable payload, 




Figure 14.  Energy density comparison of several transportation fuels (indexed to 
gasoline = 1) [35] 
as surveillance missions.    
In addition to the detector payloads, additional payloads should be included on 
vehicles to assist with navigation and surveillance.  Light detection and ranging (LiDAR) 
or other distance measuring sensors should be incorporated on the multirotor to provide 
accurate navigation when flying around buildings and other potential obstacles.  This will 
provide more accurate radiation measurements and enhanced safety by decreasing the 
likelihood that a collision occurs. Additionally, the fixed-wing UV could benefit from a 
higher quality video camera compared to cameras installed on the other vehicles.  The 
fixed-wing’s optionality to provide aerial surveillance would benefit from high-quality 
video and would better support ground operators. 
Physical Limitations and Imposed Design 
System components are constrained to the mission needs listed in the CONOPS 
and limited to the operational requirements of the mission area.  Two important 
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limitations to highlight are the restrictions on system mass and the extended endurance 
required to cover a 3 square kilometer search area.  The two limitations drive the sizing 
of each subsystem vehicle, their power plants, and the quantity of vehicles utilized in the 
system.  A minimum of three unmanned vehicles (fixed-wing, multirotor, and ground), a 
ground control station, and the accompanying storage, power, communications, and 
maintenance equipment must be containable in a truck and trailer for system deployment.  
Additionally, due to the nature of radiation emissions discussed in Chapter II, detector 
payloads are more likely to detect gamma radiations when closer to the radiological 
source material.  This negates the viability of using large unmanned vehicles that operate 
at higher altitudes such as the RQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper that are categorized as 
DoD UAS Group 4 and Group 5 systems (Table 3).   
On-board processing has been removed from the conceptualized design in the 
physical architecture.  This capability requires additional vehicle power and produces 
unwanted heat, which would reduce mission endurance and could present overheating 
issues in warmer operating environments.  Additionally, an on-board processor 
introduces the risk of leaking sensitive information regarding system software and 
vulnerabilities to adversarial forces if captured or ditched in a contested area.  This will 
be discussed in more detail later in Chapter IV.  
Power 
 As discussed previously, power production can be an issue for the fixed-wing and 
multirotor platforms.  This is dependent on payload selection for the system and the 
required flight endurance for the individual vehicles.  A liquid-fuel engine for the fixed-
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wing would increase the size of the vehicle but would greatly improve the endurance and 
the payload capacity.  Similarly, a hybrid-electric motor for the multirotor would have a 
comparable effect. However, using combustion engines would increase the complexity of 
the system regarding mechanical components and potential maintenance. Furthermore, a 
deployable system may be constrained by available types of fuel.  DoD Directive 4180.01 
promotes the use of multiple energy sources for weapon systems and equipment, where 
appropriate, and becoming operational with one battlefield fuel [36].  Typical small 
combustion engines used on fixed-wing and multirotor vehicles consume 91 octane fuel 
or higher [25].  Expeditionary vehicles, aerospace generation equipment, and power 
generation assets are typically fueled with diesel or jet propellant-8 (JP-8).  Expanding 
the capabilities of the system to utilize heavy fuels, if combustion engines are chosen for 
power generation, would provide more options for system deployment and would reduce 
vulnerabilities if 91 octane fuel is unavailable.  Small two-stroke gasoline engines (10 
cm³ to 100 cm³) have been proven to run on heavy fuels with minimal degradation to 
peak performance power.  However, this required engine modifications such as replacing 
carburetors with throttle body fuel injection systems and changing stock engine control 
units to adjustable ignition timing maps [37].     
In addition to meeting endurance and payload capacity, adequate power needs to 
be generated or supplied on-board in order to power video cameras, navigation systems, 
and payloads.  The largest payload consumer of power would be gas-filled detectors and 
semiconductor detectors, which operate at higher voltages.  With this being the case, it is 
advisable to power these detectors with separate power supplies.  Utilizing separate 
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power supplies for all detector payloads would enable optionality for handheld use and 
would reduce the complexity and drain on the vehicle’s power system.   It is possible to 
power these systems, but this also increases the size of the combustion engine and the 
vehicle frame to support the engine.  A good example is the Airborg H8 10K Hybrid 
UAS.  It claims a flight endurance of 1 hour carrying a 22-pound (10-kilogram) payload, 
with a power output of 100 watts and built-in 5 voltage direct current (VDC) and 12 VDC 
wiring.  The longest dimension of the vehicle is 6.4 feet (1.95 meters) and the total 
weight with a 22-pound payload is 110 pounds (50 kilograms) [38].  This would be 
sufficient voltage for the Ortec Micro-Detective, which requires 10 to 17 VDC for 
operation [19].   
Environmental 
 The operating environment of this system is important to understand since 
operations will primarily be outside.  Many common components used for unmanned 
vehicles are designed for use in -20° to 50° Celsius temperatures, but some components, 
such as the Ortec Micro-Detective, may have a smaller temperature window for operation 
[19], [25], [26], [39].  Other components that may be affected are batteries and circuit 
boards.  Extreme cold weather can reduce the overall power output of a battery, whereas 
extreme heat can lead to physical damage.  On-board processing equipment such as 
autopilot systems and detector payloads can also be affected by hot weather, causing 
damage to circuity and decreased performance. Desired operating temperatures for the 
system could affect component selection and design for each vehicle. 
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 In addition to temperature constraints, other weather constraints could affect the 
operational utility of the system.  Visual capabilities could be limited by fog, 
precipitation, smog, and sunlight. Unless night vision video cameras or other imaging 
solutions are utilized, night operations would be dangerous or not viable.  Additionally, 
precipitation may affect system functions, either from individual component 
waterproofing or physical limitations of vehicle propulsion.  Lastly, flying vehicles must 
maintain stable flight while airborne.  Strong steady and gusting winds would limit the 
use of flying vehicles, with the wind limits being better defined during system design. 
The last environmental concern is from obstacles and human interference.  The 
operating area may contain trees and buildings that could impede flying operations, or 
uneven terrain such as ditches and rocks for a ground vehicle.  Design considerations 
should be made to mitigate these risks, such as the addition of specific payloads to see 
and avoid terrain or the ability to traverse uneven ground with the addition of extendable 
wheels or tracks.  Additionally, the human element can interrupt vehicle operations.  
Threats can be in the form of thrown rocks, nets, vehicle theft, small arms fire, or man-
portable air defense systems.  There are few design decisions that can currently mitigate 
these threats, but technology is continuously progressing and the capability to avoid 
human threats may present itself in the future.     
Detector Payload 
In order to optimize the performance of the radiological search system, detectors 
for initial detection and spectrum collection should be evaluated separately.  It is valid to 
employ multiple detector technologies due to the diversity of radiological search 
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scenarios.  Detector selection can vary due to several reasons:  1) detector selection can 
be driven by the type of area to be searched; 2) detector selection can be dictated by the 
size of area to be searched; 3) detector selection is limited by the vehicle it will be 
deployed on; and 4) detector selection can be determined by the desired mission outcome.  
 Gas-filled detectors are well suited for area surveying during initial searches.  
More specifically, the higher applied voltage in G-M detectors results in a sensitive 
detector, which is ideal for large area searches that may require detection from long 
distances [14].  Additionally, typical COTS G-M detectors have higher radiation dose 
rate thresholds.  The high threshold enables G-M detectors to avoid detector saturation 
when in strong radiation fields, and therefore continue to function and provide radiation 
strength readings [19].  This results in a more defined geolocation of source material after 
the initial search.  However, G-M detectors do not measure the energy of incident gamma 
rays, which can be important for determining health and safety concerns for responding 
personnel. 
Scintillators can also be used for area searches but tend to have lower radiation 
dose rate thresholds [19].  This translates to detector saturation in strong radiation fields 
where G-M detectors could still be operating, resulting in a less accurate geolocation than 
G-M technologies.  However, both scintillators and semiconductors are well suited for 
gamma spectrum collection because they can distinguish between different energies of 
incident gamma rays, allowing for the identification of radioisotopes.  Scintillators are 
cheap and lightweight but produce low resolution spectrums.  On the contrary, 
semiconductors are expensive and heavy due to the required cooling systems that 
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maintain low operating temperatures but provide very high-resolution spectrums [21].  
Equipping the system with multiple technologies gives the capability for high-resolution 
spectrums, but the optionality to use the less expensive and lighter scintillator in 
unfavorable conditions.   
The vehicle type can determine payload selection.  For instance, a spectrum 
collection payload is not ideal for deploying on a fixed-wing vehicle.  Spectrum 
collection should be completed at a constant distance from a radioisotope and in a stable 
position.  A fixed-wing vehicle is unable to maintain a constant distance during flight but 
is well-suited for searching large areas when the location of source material is unknown.  
The optimal payload for a fixed-wing vehicle is a G-M detector due to its sensitivity, but 
scintillators are also a practical option.  Terrain and environmental conditions can force a 
fixed-wing UV to fly over one hundred meters AGL, making higher-sensitivity detectors 
more desirable for initial detection.  For isotope identification, the current government 
“gold standard” for gamma spectroscopy is a liquid or electromechanically cooled high 
purity germanium crystal [40].  This setup provides a superior resolution spectrum 
compared to existing scintillator technology but may not be feasible on a multirotor or 
ground vehicle due to weight limitations and the operating environment.   
The physical and immediate surroundings of each vehicle should also be assessed.   
The two main considerations for detector mounting are material interactions and 
susceptibility to impact.  Interactions with other vehicle materials can include vibration-
induced gamma counts, gamma counts produced from other on-board electronic 
equipment, and self-imposed shielding.  Unintentional shielding can happen when an 
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intervening material from a vehicle is between the detector media and the radiological 
source.  The intervening material can weaken or alter the gamma energies incident on the 
detector, ultimately decreasing the potential for initial detection and degrading the 
accuracy of spectrum collection [19].  Similarly, shielding material may need to be 
utilized between the detector and other electronic hardware in order to reduce false 
gamma readings that occur from other types of electromagnetic radiation.  The other 
physical consideration is the potential for detector impact.  Collision with obstacles, 
human interactions, and harsh landings can affect detector performance and can dictate 
payload attachment and hardening design.  Depending on the detector and the vehicle, 
attachment options can be limited due to size and weight.  Vehicle center of gravity 
constraints and chassis strength will drive mounting options to ensure that vehicles safely 
fly and maneuver as designed.  Detector hardening may also be limited due to vehicle 
payload capacity but should be evaluated during system design. 
One last consideration for payload selection is the additional capability for the 
detectors to be used in a handheld configuration by the system’s human operators.  
Situations may present themselves where the initial search, the spectrum collection, or 
both methods are not appropriate for unmanned vehicles.  Terrain, environmental 
conditions, and other on-scene factors can differ from provided intelligence.  Once an 
operational team arrives at the search location, it may be logical to modify the mission 
plan to conduct a portion of or the entire mission using personnel search teams.  
Depending on their equipping, they may need the capability to conduct searches with the 
same equipment deployed on the UV system.  Commonly used GOTS and COTS 
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handheld detectors can vary in price from $1,000 to $100,000, which is contingent on the 
type of technology purchased [39].  It may be more cost effective to include handheld-
operable equipment in the system.  This would limit the overall detector acquisition cost 
to the end user, avoiding the need for redundant technologies that are dedicated to either a 
UV system or a human operator.  If handheld detectors are employed, it is essential that 
the detector’s human interface can be bypassed in order to send data and receive 
commands.  A commonly used COTS semiconductor detector designed for handheld use 
is the Ortec Micro-Detective.  As previously mentioned, it utilizes an HPGe crystal to 
provide a spectral resolution of less than one percent.  The purchase price for this 
equipment is upwards of $100,000 but provides the highest-quality gamma spectrum 
compared to other spectrum-collection technologies.  With a weight of 15 pounds (6.8 
kilograms), this equipment is only suitable for the ground UV and for short-duration trips 
with a large multirotor [19].  However, including this piece of equipment also enables the 
human operator to collect a high-resolution spectrum if the mission dictates.  
Additionally, there are many COTS handheld detectors that come equipped with G-M 
and scintillation technology [19].  This could increase the efficiency of a mission by 
completing the initial search and radioisotope identification with one vehicle trip, thus 
avoiding payload exchange when a high-resolution spectrum is not required.  This is only 
practical on the ground and multirotor UVs due to the constant distance required for 
spectrum collection.  The flexibility of equipping the UV system with handheld 
technology increases the probability of mission success regardless of evolving or 
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unforeseen circumstances.  Table 1Table 9summarizes considerations for UV detector 
selection in order to meet operational needs.  
Table 9.  Vehicle and detector compatibility selection 
  Ground Multirotor Fixed-wing 
Limitations 
Terrain/obstacles                             
Slow                                  
2-D coverage 
Endurance               
Payload weight 
No dwell                                  
Advantages 
Dwell time/stability            
Manipulator arm                   
Heavy payload 
3-D coverage                 
Accessibility 
Hover/land for stability 
Large area coverage                  
Long endurance                         
Aerial surveillance                    
Suitable 
Technologies 
Gas-filled         
Scintillator           
Semiconductor  
Gas-filled         












Communication Modems & On-board Processing 
As mentioned in the similar componentry assessment, comparable communication 
modem pairs could be used to provide redundancy and flexibility throughout the system 
if hardware becomes inoperable.  Additionally, on-board processors have been removed 
from the Cameo physical decomposition to reduce power-draw, weight, heat, and to 
avoid sensitive data exploitation if a vehicle is lost or stolen.  If vehicle on-board 
processors are included during system design and testing, multiple modems may not be 
necessary for each vehicle.  However, in order to capture, combine, and encrypt multiple 
payload data and video feeds, a custom communication modem and processor may be 
required that is not available commercially or through existing government PORs.   
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The development of a custom communication modem and processor will depend 
on the established requirements, payload selection, and discoveries during the design and 
testing phases.  The system needs the ability to communicate amongst a GCS and 
multiple UVs while encrypting and combining data streams, and also providing the 
flexibility for future payloads to be added to the system.  There may not be a component 
that will satisfy system demands and be available commercially.  Sourced payload 
manufacturers may not have compatible output data and could pose problems when 
sending or processing different data packet types and lengths.  These reasons could force 
a requirement for on-board processing to assist with data management before 
communicating from a vehicle to the GCS.  The on-board processor could be integrated 
with a communication platform that is equipped on each UV and the GCS.  This could 
solve issues posed by data compatibility, encryption, data combination, and time 
synchronization.  A solution for these issues would most likely necessitate a custom-
designed component in order to function properly, as well as provide the flexibility to for 
additional payloads and other mission areas.   
Processing Software         
In addition to a custom-designed communication and processing package, custom 
software will likely need to be developed.  This includes software on the GCS platform as 
well as software for the on-board processors.  Vehicle software should be capable of 
combining data from various payloads and the autopilot before relaying the information 
to the GCS.  Simultaneously, the software must decipher commands received from the 
GCS before relaying the commands to the appropriate vehicle components.  On the 
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ground, GCS software provides input and output functionality to the GCS operator.  The 
software should be able to merge pertinent data received from a vehicle autopilot, 
detector payload, and video camera into one visual interface.  It should have the 
capability to display real-time radiological data, display a three-dimensional radiological 
strength contour map of the search area, and provide source location estimates from the 
combined radiation data and telemetry data (Figure 15).  Additionally, the software  
 
Figure 15.  3-D radiation strength map (left) of a vehicle search pattern (right) [41] 
should provide real-time and planned vehicle locations on a map, similar to existing 
autopilot software suites.  Lastly, the software should provide command options for both 
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vehicle navigation and payload functions, such as starting and stopping spectrum 
collection, controlling camera gimbals and articulator arms, and being able to toggle 
between autonomous and controlled movement. 
Analysis of Feasibility and Utility 
 After progressing through concept development, applicable scenarios, a task and 
physical decomposition of the system, and design considerations, the overarching query 
remains whether the system would be practical to employ and what utility it could 
provide to the radiological search mission and other mission areas.   The concept 
system’s abilities can be fundamentally evaluated through sizing and endurance 
estimations for multirotor and fixed-wing UVs.  Ground vehicles are more forgiving with 
payload capacity, and therefore will not be analyzed due to the several COTS options that 
meet example payload requirements [42], [43], [44].    
Air vehicle sizing and performance will be centered on assumptions founded upon 
similarly sized UAS specifications and incorporating handheld detector weights where 
appropriate.  Assumptions are made for component sizes, efficiency ratings, air speeds, 
and mass fractions based on AFIT professor knowledge, existing literature, and existing 
COTS systems [45], [45], [46].  Mass fractions (𝑀𝐹) are typically tracked for vehicle 
payloads and for power sources (i.e. battery, fuel), and provide thresholds for vehicle 
estimates.  The mass fractions for unmanned vehicles typically fall within the same 
range, with the fuel mass fraction ranging from 0.2 to 0.3 and the payload ranging from 
0.1 to 0.3 [45].   Mass fractions can be estimated using Equation 2.   
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𝑀𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 =  
𝑊𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑊𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑓
                       (2) 
Incorporating handheld detectors would be the worst-case scenario for payload weight 
and size due to the additional weight from ruggedized cases and integrated power 
supplies, but it also gauges the feasibility of employing handheld detectors on UV 
platforms.  Custom-designed detectors can be a fraction of the weight but typically do not 
include power sources, hardening, or user interfaces for handheld operation.  Example 
payloads will be used for multirotor sizing, whereas fixed-wing vehicles will use mass 
fractions and total takeoff weight to determine system endurance.   
 
Electric Multirotor Sizing 
  Multirotor sizing is estimated from derived power equations related to current 
draw and battery capacity that can maintain the vehicle in a constant hover.  The power 
required for each prop (𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝) is dependent on vehicle mass (m), the area and efficiency 
of the prop (𝐴𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝, 𝜂𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝), the number of motors (𝑛𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠), and the density of air (𝜌𝑎𝑖𝑟) 









           (3) 
The power required for each prop to maintain hover determines the current required for 
each motor (𝐼𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟), which also depends on the battery voltage (𝑉𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦) and the motor 






     (4) 
The total current (𝐼𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙) required for vehicle operation is found using the total number of 
motors (𝑛𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠) and additional current requirements (𝐼𝑎𝑢𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦) (Equation 5) [46].   
𝐼𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝐼𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟 ∙ 𝑛𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝐼𝑎𝑢𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦    (5) 
In order to determine the UV’s endurance (𝐸), the usable battery capacity (𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒) has 
to be calculated by using the rated capacity of the battery (𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑), the efficiency of the 
battery (𝜂𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦), the permissible battery discharge depth (𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒), and the number of 
batteries (𝑛𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠) (Equations 6-7) [46]. 
𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 =  𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑  ∙ 𝜂𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦 ∙ 𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 ∙ 𝑛𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠       (6) 
𝐸 =  
𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝐼𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
            (7) 
Sizing was calculated for electric DoD UAS Group 1 and Group 2 multirotor 
vehicles.  The Group 1 multirotor was estimated to carry a FLIR IdentiFINDER R400-
NG, which has a NaI(Tl) scintillator for dose rate measurement and radioisotope 
identification and a G-M tube for high radiation field dose rate equivalence.  This 
payload adds 1.2 kilograms to the overall mass with dimensions of 24.9 centimeters × 9.4 
centimeters × 7.6 centimeters and an 8-hour runtime on internal batteries [19].  A Tarot 
T960 hexacopter frame with Tarot 5008-340KV motors were used for mass and power 
estimates.  Including two 10 ampere-hour 6-cell lithium polymer (LiPo) batteries to the 
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system, the overall mass is 9 kilograms, which is within the threshold for Group 1 UAS.  
Hovering at this weight produces an overall endurance of 20 minutes.  A summary of the 
input data and results can be found at Table 10. 
Table 10.  Group 1 electric multirotor endurance estimate 
Payload mass [kg] 1.2 
Mass w/out batteries/payload [kg]  5.3 
Gravity [m/s²] 9.86 
Air density [kg/m³] 1.2 
Prop diameter [in] 18 
Prop diameter [m] 0.46 
Prop efficiency 0.8 
Motor efficiency 0.8 
# battery cells 6 
Rated battery capacity [Ah] 10 
Battery voltage [volts] 22.2 
Battery mass [kg] 1.32 
# batteries 2 
Battery efficiency 0.9 
Permissible battery discharge 0.8 
Usable battery capacity [Ah] 14.4 
# motors 6 
Motor mass [g]  168 
Auxiliary current [A] 5 
Total mass [kg] 9 
Power required per prop [W] 115.9 
Current required per motor [A] 6.5 
Total current [A] 44.2 
Endurance [min] 19.6 
 
The Group 2 multirotor was estimated to carry an Ortec Micro-Detective-DX, 
which uses an HPGe semiconductor and electromechanical Stirling-cycle cooler for dose 
rate measurement and high-resolution identification.  This payload adds 6.8 kilograms to 
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the overall mass with dimensions of 37.3 centimeters × 14.6 centimeters × 27.9 
centimeters and a 5-hour runtime on its lithium-ion battery pack [19].  A Tarot T960 
hexacopter frame with T-Motor-U7-420KV motors were used for mass and power 
estimates.  Including three 10 ampere-hour 6-cell LiPo batteries to the system, the overall 
mass is 16.7 kilograms, which is 6 kilograms below the Group 3 UAS threshold.  
However, it should be noted that the total mass exceeds the recommended 15-kilogram 
design threshold for the frame [47].  This estimate, although not advisable for design 
purposes, provides a best-case operating endurance using the lightweight frame and 
heavy payload.  Even with these risky operating parameters, hovering at this weight only 















Table 11.  Group 2 electric multirotor endurance estimate 
Payload mass [kg] 6.8 
Mass w/out batteries [kg]  5.9 
Gravity [m/s²] 9.86 
Air density [kg/m³] 1.2 
Prop diameter [in] 18 
Prop diameter [m] 0.46 
Prop efficiency 0.8 
Motor efficiency 0.8 
# battery cells 6 
Rated battery capacity [Ah] 10 
Battery voltage [volts] 22.2 
Battery mass [kg] 1.32 
# batteries 3 
Battery efficiency 0.9 
Permissible battery discharge 0.8 
Usable battery capacity [Ah] 21.6 
# motors 6 
Motor mass [g]  255 
Auxiliary current [A] 5 
Total mass [kg] 16.7 
Power required per prop [W] 285.3 
Current required per motor [A] 16.1 
Total current [A] 101.4 
Endurance [min] 12.8 
 
Hybrid-electric Multirotor Sizing 
Group 1 and Group 2 electric multirotors provide short endurance flights, which 
limits their application to cover small search areas.  Therefore, an estimate was 
completed of a Group 2 hybrid-electric multirotor that uses a gasoline generator to charge 
a LiPo battery to power the motors.  The gasoline provides a higher specific energy while 
the battery provides a simpler and more reliable method for throttling power to the six 
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electric motors.  The same Ortec Micro-Detective-DX payload was used, but this time a 
GAIA 160 Elite Pro 2.4 kilowatt hybrid-electric drone was used as a baseline system 
[48]. The same power equation (Equation 3) was used to determine the power required 
per prop, which was then totaled for the entire system.  The gas generator can supply a 
constant 2.4 kilowatts of power at a fuel burn rate of 2.5 liters per hour.  This allows for 
an endurance of 58 minutes when flying with 3 liters of fuel and retaining 20% of fuel at 
the end of mission.  Results from the estimation are detailed in Table 12. 
Table 12.  Group 2 hybrid-electric multirotor endurance estimate 
Payload mass [kg] 6.8 
Mass fraction payload 0.30 
Generator system mass [kg] 4.2 
Mass w/out payload [kg]  13.7 
Gas density [kg/L] 0.76 
Fuel capacity [L] 3 
Mass of fuel [kg] 2.3 
Mass fraction fuel and batteries 0.2 
Gravity [m/sec²] 9.86 
Air density [kg/m³] 1.2 
Prop diameter [in] 29 
Prop diameter [m] 0.74 
Prop efficiency 0.8 
Motor efficiency 0.8 
# battery cells 6 
Rated battery capacity [Ah] 5 
Battery voltage [volts] 22.2 
Battery mass [kg] 0.85 
# batteries 2 
# motors 6 
Auxiliary current [A] 5 
Total mass [kg] 22.8 
Power required per prop [W] 282.8 
Power required system [W] 2232 
Fuel burn rate (2.4kW) [L/hr] 2.5 
Endurance [min] 57.6 
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Fixed-wing Sizing  
Fixed-wing sizing was completed for a Group 1 electric vehicle and a Group 2 
gasoline-powered vehicle.  The maximum takeoff weights (𝑊𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑓) for the electric and 
gasoline UVs are the maximum allowable for Group 1 and Group 2 vehicles, which are 9 
kilograms and 25 kilograms respectively.  Vehicle airspeeds (𝑣) were varied for both 
vehicles so high and low endurance estimates can be compared.  The lift-to-drag ratios 
(𝐿/𝐷) were also varied in order to provide endurance ranges.  The endurance equation is 
similar to the multirotor endurance equation, but the battery power equation incorporates 
the takeoff weight, the vehicle air speed, the lift-to-drag ratio, and the summated 
propulsion efficiencies (𝜂𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛) from the electronic speed controller, the propeller, 
and the motor (Equations 8-9) [45].   
𝐸 =  
𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 ∙𝑉𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦
𝑃𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦
                          (8) 
𝑃𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦 =  
𝑊𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑓∙𝑣
𝐿/𝐷∙∏ 𝜂𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
                (9) 
For the fixed-wing vehicles, specific payloads were not chosen for mass.  Instead, 
a mass fraction of 15% of the takeoff weight was used for the allowable payload mass in 
order to estimate the endurance.  The endurances for the Group 1 electric vehicle range 
from 41 to 69 minutes when flying at a constant angle of attack at the given cruise 




Table 13.  Group 1 electric fixed-wing endurance estimate 
Airspeed [m/s] 16 20 16 20 
L/D 6 6 8 8 
Mass fraction battery 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Mass fraction payload 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Battery mass allowable [kg] 2.73 2.73 2.73 2.73 
Payload mass allowable [kg] 1.36 1.36 1.36 1.36 
Total mass [kg] 9 9 9 9 
Gravity [m/s²] 9.86 9.86 9.86 9.86 
Prop efficiency 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Motor efficiency 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
# battery cells 6 6 6 6 
Rated battery capacity [Ah] 10 10 10 10 
Battery voltage [volts] 22.2 22.2 22.2 22.2 
Battery mass [kg]  1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 
# batteries 2 2 2 2 
Battery efficiency 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Permissible battery discharge 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Usable battery capacity [Ah] 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 
Power required thrust [W] 239.0 298.8 179.3 224.1 
Power required from battery [W] 373.5 466.9 280.1 350.1 
Endurance [hr] 0.9 0.7 1.1 0.9 
Endurance [min] 51.4 41.1 68.5 54.8 
 
The endurance estimate for gasoline engine requires the brake specific fuel consumption 
(𝐵𝑆𝐹𝐶) (Equation 10).  A representative vehicle that is under the 25-kilogram Group 2  






)        (10) 
threshold is the Silver Fox, which has a 𝐵𝑆𝐹𝐶 of 395 grams per kilowatt-hour [49].  The 
estimated endurances for a gasoline-powered vehicle using this 𝐵𝑆𝐹𝐶 range from 12 to 
24 hours with a payload near 2 kilograms (Table 14). 
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Table 14.  Group 2 gasoline fixed-wing endurance estimate 
Airspeed [m/s] 20 30 20 30 
L/D 6 6 8 8 
Mass fraction fuel 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Mass fraction payload 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Fuel [kg] 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 
Payload [kg] 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 
Total mass [kg] 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 
Prop efficiency 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
BSFC [g/kW-hr] 395 395 395 395 
Endurance [hr] 17.7 11.8 23.6 15.8 
 
Feasibility for Current Radiological Search Operations 
At a minimum, the conceptualized system would serve useful for a portion of 
current operations. Executing the entire operation from the initial search through 
completing source disposal is unlikely. This is due to the potential unfavorable scenarios 
and environmental conditions that could be encountered, especially when weighing the 
limited performance of certain vehicles such as the electric multirotor endurance and 
payload capacity.  Incorporating the system into a portion of operations is very feasible.  
For instance, conducting an initial search of a large area would be extremely useful for 
responding personnel, especially if the terrain is difficult to navigate by foot or is not 
accessible by vehicle.  Once the initial search area has been decreased, unmanned 
platforms could provide an excellent asset for surveillance by providing immediate 
feedback to personnel on the ground.  However, confirmation activities using the 
unmanned system may have limited applicability.  In most permissible scenarios, human 
operators are best suited to finish ground operations including spectrum collection and 
follow-on activities.  Non-permissible environments may warrant the full utilization of 
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the radiological search system, especially when strong sources or nefarious activity and 
entrapments are involved.  Nevertheless, utilizing the system in place of human operators 
is dependent on system-mitigated hazards and efficiently accomplishing the tasks 
expected of human teams.  
When considering the estimated endurances for the vehicle power plant 
configurations, there are performance constraints for some vehicles and optionality for 
others.  The fixed-wing is able to execute the mission using both electric and gasoline 
power plants.  The endurance and payload capacity are much higher for the gasoline 
engine, but the overall size of the vehicle is increased.  The larger size could decrease 
vehicle maneuverability, forcing the vehicle to fly at a higher and safer operating altitude.  
This is not ideal for detecting radiation.  Therefore, detector sensitivity, operating 
altitude, and airspeed should be assessed when selecting the fixed-wing vehicle and 
detector payload.  On the other hand, multirotor vehicles are limited to hybrid-electric 
setups in order to provide sufficient endurance while carrying a detector payload. This 
would supply enough power to ingress, collect a spectrum, and egress from any estimated 
source location.  Battery-powered multirotors offer limited endurance and are too risky 
for incorporating into the radiological search system.   
An important aspect of evaluating system feasibility is the cost of the system, 
which depends on design decisions and other factors that are not the focus of this 
research.  Regardless of having a tangible price, the same comparison needs to be made 
concerning the cost of the system against the utility it provides the user.  The 
procurement cost and recurring costs will not be worthwhile for some agencies based 
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upon their scope of responsibility and the probability that they will have to respond to a 
lost or stolen radiological source.  The typical small-town police department would not 
benefit from this system as both the probability of response is low and there is most likely 
a federal or state asset that is the principal agency for this type of emergency response.  
Agencies that would benefit from this system would be those responsible for large 
metropolitan areas, have a high-threat environment including radiological material, cover 
high-density areas of NRC Category 1 and Category 2 radioactive materials, and those 
that are deemed principal responding agencies per governing policy.  State and local 
agencies that could realistically benefit from an unmanned search system include large 
metropolitan area police departments and high-volume ports.  Federal applicability ties 
directly to existing policy and emergency response plans that define who is responsible 
for specific emergency scenarios and jurisdictional areas, such as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the DOE and national laboratories, the Department of Homeland Security, 
and the DoD.  For example, the Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) under the DOE 
is one of many organizations formed to assist with radiological emergency responses. 
The United States is split into nine geographic regions that are covered by separate RAP 
teams [50].  These teams could benefit from an unmanned radiological search system as 
part of their equipment suite to cover the array of radiological response missions they are 
responsible for.  
The last issue that this system would introduce is logistical requirements on the 
owning organization.  Like the initial procurement cost of the system, the cost for 
maintenance and replacement parts should be measured against the utility of the system. 
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Maintenance issues can be time consuming and costly, which depends on the complexity 
of the system and the necessity to procure specialty tools or equipment.   If maintenance 
is completed by the owning organization, maintenance hours on this system would 
decrease hours spent on other serviced equipment and potentially impact other mission 
areas.  Increased manpower or dedicated maintenance technicians may be necessary, 
which also increases the overall cost.  If a separate maintenance contract is determined to 
be the optimal route, this requires continual funding to ensure the system maintains 
operational readiness.  The aforementioned costs will help decision-makers determine the 
realistic acquisition and implementation of this system. 
Utility to Other Missions 
 It is crucial to look at the applicability and extension of the radiological search 
system to other mission areas.  Expanding the operational reach of the system to other 
mission areas would also increase the overall value for government and private entities.  
This increase in the asset’s value could result in more emphasis on mission application, 
funding, maintenance, and development of future systems and system payloads.  
Providing a niche-solution to the radiological search mission will only attract niche 
customers.  An infrequently used equipment set makes it challenging for the end user to 
reorient on system functionality and could lead to mechanical maintenance issues due to 
inactivity.  Therefore, expanding the applicability of the system should be beneficial in 
terms of utility and cost effectiveness.  Some consequences of expanding the mission 
coverage could include optional sizing of ground and air vehicles, the inclusion of a 
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water-borne platform, and a more flexible vehicle architecture that can interface with 
numerous payloads.   
 In order to promote a flexible system that can apply to other missions, some 
modifications will need to be made.  The system architecture is currently geared toward a 
radiological search mission with three specific vehicle options that all serve a certain 
purpose and accomplish certain tasks.  There is some flexibility built into the system with 
separate modems for autopilot, video, and payloads.  However, the promoted sizing for 
both the vehicle chassis and the power plant configurations are geared toward lifting a 
6.8-kilogram payload for the multirotor and ground UVs as well as providing increased 
endurance for the fixed-wing UV by integrating a combustion engine.  These narrowed 
solutions serve the purpose of meeting the intent established in the CONOPS.  In order to 
provide a more comprehensive system, a new CONOPS and system architecture should 
be developed with a more holistic approach to incorporate current and emerging 
missions.  As previously discussed, this would necessitate the customization of some 
hardware components such as the communication modem and processor suite in addition 
to on-board and GCS software.  These additions would provide the capability for multiple 
vehicles to interchange payloads and the ability to reprogram system software to be 
compatible with a variety of components and data types.  
Summary 
The radiological search system has been characterized starting with the system 
CONOPS and resulting in the physical framework to meet the capabilities and 
assumptions determined by the CONOPS.  Following the characterization of the system, 
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a feasibility analysis considered the potential benefits and disadvantages that the system 
presents and must be evaluated when determining the overall utility of the system to the 
mission area.  The analysis determined that the system could apply to current radiological 
search operations but may be limited to certain portions of the mission and constrained to 
specific organizations.   Lastly, it was concluded that the system could be applied to other 
missions, but it may need to be modified to provide enhanced flexibility and a more 















V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Overview 
 Within the counter-WMD mission space, radiological and nuclear terrorism is an 
imminent and constant threat to United States national security.  Developing and 
employing new technologies is crucial for safeguarding this nation, and a radiological 
search system is a potential solution to assist and strengthen the radiological search 
mission space.  It would provide more execution options to responding personnel and the 
ability to remove the human element from hazardous situations.     
Review of Findings 
 A CONOPS was developed by incorporating mission needs and constraints for 
radiological search operations.  Utilizing the radiological search CONOPS, use cases and 
a functional decomposition were derived that account for the necessary tasks to complete 
radiological search missions.  A physical architecture was created in order to allocate 
physical components to satisfy task completion.  After completing the hierarchical 
decomposition, it is evident that the system necessitates a multidimensional construct 
with multiple vehicle platforms and distinct detector payloads that are governed by 
scenario or mission criteria.  Each detector technology can be optimally applied to select 
portions of the radiological search mission, such as initial search operations or gamma 
spectrum collection.  Similarly, certain vehicle platforms are ideal for or are limited to 
specific segments of the mission.  In order to cover the gamut of radiological search 
mission tasks, the system needs multiple vehicle options and interchangeable detector 
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payloads with an adaptable system framework.  The conceptual system was found to be 
feasible in terms of constructability and operability based upon currently available 
technologies, but it may have limited application to the mission area.  Hybrid-electric 
power plants would be a necessity for multirotor endurance and payload capacity, 
whereas fixed-wing vehicles could safely operate with battery or gasoline-powered 
options.  In order to maximize the utility and effectiveness of the system to other DoD 
mission areas, the system needs to be expanded to provide more optionality for payload 
integration, vehicle selection, and software flexibility.  This includes a universal system 
architecture and software suite that can adapt to emerging technologies and mission 
areas.  
Study Limitations 
The research was scoped to cover system application to radiological and nuclear 
material search and spectroscopy activities in the next two to five years.  Assumptions 
guided the creation of the CONOPS, as user requirements for the system do not exist.  
The research did not incorporate consequence management surveying following 
accidents or terrorism activity involving nuclear or radiological materials.  Content was 
limited to publicly available information and did not dwell at a higher-level of 
classification.  Tactics, techniques, and procedures for the system were not covered, as 
the focus was characterizing the system and its operational feasibility and utility of the 
system to the radiological search mission.  Lastly, research was limited by funding and 




There are multiple avenues for future research involving unmanned systems to 
accomplish radiological search missions.  Options align with a continuation of the 
Systems Engineering “V” concept by conducting a detailed system design, developing 
custom hardware or software for the vehicles and GCS, or completing a cost analysis of 
system procurement and lifecycle operating costs for the end user.  Utilizing a decision-
based engineering design framework will provide rigor to the engineering design process 
and ensures that value theory is applied to system development [51].  These additional 
areas would provide more tangible findings and insight to the system’s utility when 
weighed against acquisition and recurring costs.  
Another research opportunity is refining or building a new architecture to expand 
the radiological search system to multiple mission areas.  The application of the system to 
other missions was briefly discussed in Chapter IV.  This would include additional 
ground and air vehicles, waterborne vehicles for maritime operations, a custom 
communication and processing package, and custom system software for both the GCS 
and UVs.  An extended application to current mission areas with the flexibility to cover 
emerging missions would greatly increase the utility and value of the system. 
In Chapter IV’s design considerations, employing handheld detectors on system 
vehicles was considered for increasing the flexibility of the overall system and avoiding a 
mission stoppage if conditions change.  It would be beneficial to compare commonly 
used handheld detectors to COTS and GOTS detectors designed for vehicle applications.  
Detectors can be evaluated on performance in different radiation field configurations, 
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vehicle emplacement options and limitations, integration with system hardware and 
software, and expected procurement and lifecycle costs. 
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Appendix A.  Subsystem Physical Allocation Matrices 

































































































































































































































































Auto land ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Auto takeoff ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Calculate target coord
Capture video ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Collect rad data ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Collect rad spectrum
Combine rad data/telemetry
Conduct BIT ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗












Follow search pattern ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Initiate search
Load MP ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗







































































































































































































































































































Loiter ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Navigate waypoints ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Perform autopilot functions ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Perform controlled movement ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Perform GCS activities
Perform rad measurement ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Perform rad search activities ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Perform vehicle activities ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Perform vehicle data comm ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Process
Provide data comm w/ vehicle
Provide I/O w/ GCS operator
Provide video ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗






Report MP load status ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Send cmd
Send rad data ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Send spectrum data
Send telemetry ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗














































































































































































































































Auto land ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Auto takeoff ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Calculate target coord
Capture video ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Collect rad data ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Collect rad spectrum ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Combine rad data/telemetry
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Load MP ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Payload Module Power Module Vehicle
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Loiter ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Navigate waypoints ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Perform autopilot functions ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Perform controlled movement ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Perform GCS activities
Perform rad measurement ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Perform rad search activities ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Perform vehicle activities ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Perform vehicle data comm ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Process
Provide data comm w/ vehicle
Provide I/O w/ GCS operator
Provide video ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗






Report MP load status ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Send cmd
Send rad data ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Send spectrum data ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Send telemetry ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗




























































































































































































































































































Auto land ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Auto takeoff ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Calculate target coord
Capture video ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Collect rad data ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Collect rad spectrum ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Combine rad data/telemetry
Conduct BIT ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗












Follow search pattern ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Initiate search























































































































































































































































































































Navigation Module Payload Module Power Module
Loiter ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Navigate waypoints ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Perform autopilot functions ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Perform controlled movement ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Perform GCS activities
Perform rad measurement ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Perform rad search activities ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Perform vehicle activities ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Perform vehicle data comm ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Process
Provide data comm w/ vehicle
Provide I/O w/ GCS operator
Provide video ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗






Report MP load status ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Send cmd
Send rad data ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Send spectrum data ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Send telemetry ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗


































































































































Analyze spectrum data ↗ ↗
Auto land
Auto takeoff




Combine rad data/telemetry ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Conduct BIT
Connect to GCS
Connect to vehicle ↗ ↗ ↗
Construct MP ↗ ↗ ↗
Create rad map ↗ ↗ ↗
Display MP status ↗ ↗ ↗
Display rad data ↗ ↗ ↗
Display rad map ↗ ↗ ↗
Display rad spectrum ↗ ↗ ↗
Display radionuclide ↗ ↗ ↗
Display target coord ↗ ↗ ↗
Display telemetry ↗ ↗ ↗
Display video ↗ ↗ ↗
Follow search pattern
Initiate search ↗ ↗ ↗
Load MP


































































































































Perform GCS activities ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Perform rad measurement
Perform rad search activities
Perform vehicle activities
Perform vehicle data comm
Process ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Provide data comm w/ vehicle ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Provide I/O w/ GCS operator ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
Provide video
Receive cmd
Receive MP status ↗ ↗ ↗
Receive rad data ↗ ↗ ↗
Receive spectrum data ↗ ↗ ↗
Receive telemetry ↗ ↗ ↗
Receive video ↗ ↗ ↗
Report MP load status





Store rad data ↗ ↗
Store spectrum data ↗ ↗
Store target coord ↗ ↗
Store telemetry ↗ ↗
Store video ↗ ↗
Trigger self-destruct actuator
Write MP ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
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This Use Case encompasses deployment of the Rad Search System vehicle(s) and ingress to the search 
area. 
 
Preconditions:   
Successful completion of Perform Setup Use Case 
GPS Lock 
 
Primary Flow:   
1. Ground Control Station Operator initiates Launch mode through Ground Control Station 
2. Ground Control Station changes Vehicle mode to Launch 
3. Vehicle enters Launch mode 
4. Vehicle transmits telemetry to Ground Control Station(s) 
5. Ground Control Station(s) receives and displays telemetry data 
6. Ground Control Station(s) stores telemetry data 
7. Ground Crew launches Vehicle 
8. Vehicle establishes controlled movement or stable flight 
9. Vehicle maneuvers toward search area 
10. Ground Control Station Operator observes received data on Ground Control Station 
11. Once Vehicle arrives at Search Insertion point, it enters Search mode 
12. End Use Case 
 
Alternate Flow:   
At any time: 
  a. If bad Vehicle health, Ground Control Station Operator enters RTL command on Ground Control 
Station 
  b. Ground Control Station sends RTL command to Vehicle 
  c. Vehicle enters RTL mode 
At any time: 
  a. Operator initiates <<include>> Plan Mission Use Case 
  b. Vehicle ingresses to new Search Insertion point 
At any time: 
  a. If vehicle compromise is evident, execute <<extend>> Perform Self-Destruct Use Case  
 
Postconditions:  Vehicle arrives at Search Insertion point and enters Search mode 
 
Involves:   
GNSS 
Ground Control Station Operator 
Ground Crew 
 















This Use Case covers the RTL actions required to return the vehicle to home location or specified 
location with recovery. 
 
Preconditions:  Vehicle has entered RTL mode 
 
Primary Flow:   
1. Vehicle maneuvers toward home/recovery point 
2. Vehicle arrives at home/recovery point 
3. Vehicle executes auto-land maneuver 
4. Ground Control Station Operator and Ground Crew recovers Vehicle 
5. End Use Case 
 
Alternate Flow:  At any time: 
  a. If bad vehicle health, Ground Control Station Operator enters RTL command on Ground Control 
Station 
  b. Ground Control Station sends RTL command to Vehicle 
  c. Vehicle enters RTL mode 
At any time: 
  a. Ground Control Station Operator initiates Plan Mission Use Case 
  b. Vehicle ingresses to new Search Insertion point 
At any time: 
  a. If vehicle compromise is evident, execute <<extend>> Perform Self-Destruct Use Case  
 
Postconditions:  Vehicle is safely recovered by Ground Crew 
 
Involves:   
GNSS 
Ground Control System Operator 
Ground Crew 
 
















This Use Case covers confirmation activities 
 
Preconditions:  Target has been located and a Vehicle has entered Confirmation mode 
 
Primary Flow:   
1. Vehicle transmits telemetry data, rad data, and video to Ground Control Station(s) and Off-Board C2 
2. Ground Control Station(s) receives and displays telemetry data, rad data, and video 
3. Ground Control Station(s) stores telemetry data, rad data, and video 
4. Vehicle navigates to and hovers or remains near target 
5. Ground Control Station sends collect rad spectrum data command 
6. Vehicle receives and initiates rad spectrum collection 
7. Vehicle transmits rad spectrum data 
8. Ground Control Station(s) receives, stores, and displays rad spectrum data 
9. Ground Control Station Operator terminates rad spectrum collection 
10. Ground Control Station processes rad spectrum data and displays radionuclide identification 
11. Ground Control Station Operator initiates RTL 
12. Ground Control Station sends RTL command to Vehicle 
13. Vehicle enters RTL mode 
14. End Use Case 
 
Alternate Flow:   
At any time: 
  a. If bad vehicle health, Ground Control Station Operator enters RTL command on Ground Control 
Station 
  b. Ground Control Station sends RTL command to Vehicle 
  c. Vehicle enters RTL mode 
At any time: 
  a. If vehicle no longer required due to deployed sensor package, Ground Control Station Operator enters 
RTL command 
  b. Ground Control Station sends RTL command to Vehicle 
  c. Vehicle enters RTL mode 
At any time: 
  a. Ground Control Station Operator initiates <<include>> Plan Mission Use Case 
  b. Vehicle ingresses to new Search Insertion point or Confirmation coordinates 
At any time: 
  a. If vehicle compromise is evident, execute <<extend>> Perform Self-Destruct Use Case  
  b. Vehicle self-destructs 
 
Postconditions:  Vehicle hovers or remains near target for > 5 minutes and rad spectrum is stored and 
displayed on Ground Control Station(s) with suspected radionuclide identification; Vehicle enters RTL 
mode 
 
Involves:   
GNSS 
Off-Board C2 Operator 
Target 



























This Use Case covers execution of search patterns 
 
Preconditions: Vehicle arrives at insertion point and has transitioned to Search mode; Mission Plan is 
loaded by GCS 
 
Primary Flow:   
1. Vehicle transmits telemetry data, rad data, and video to Ground Control Station(s) and Off-Board C2 
2. Ground Control Station(s) receives and displays telemetry data, rad data, and video 
3. Ground Control Station(s) continuously combines telemetry and rad data and displays as a radiation 
strength map 
3. Ground Control Station(s) stores telemetry data, rad data, and video 
4. Vehicle follows search pattern according to Mission Plan 
5. Ground Control Station Operator and Off-Board C2 monitor rad data, navigation data, and video 
6. Vehicle completes search pattern according to Mission Plan 
7. Ground Control Station determines target(s) coordinates from received rad data and telemetry data 
8. Ground Control Station Operator commands change to Confirmation mode 
9. Ground Control Station sends Confirmation mode change 
10. Vehicle enters Confirmation mode 
11. End Use Case 
 
Alternate Flow:   
At any time: 
  a. If bad vehicle health, Ground Control Station Operator enters RTL command 
  b. Ground Control Station sends RTL command to Vehicle 
  c. Vehicle enters RTL mode 
At any time: 
  a. If vehicle no longer required due to deployed sensor package, Ground Control Station Operator enters 
RTL command 
  b. Ground Control Station sends RTL command to Vehicle 
  c. Vehicle enters RTL mode 
At any time: 
  a. Ground Control Station Operator initiates <<include>> Plan Mission Use Case 
  b. Vehicle ingresses to new Search Insertion point (may be used to further loiter or investigate target 
location) 
At any time: 
  a. If vehicle compromise is evident, execute <<extend>> Perform Self-Destruct Use Case  
  b. Vehicle self-destructs 
 
Postconditions:  Target is identified through radiation sensor data and telemetry data and target 
coordinates are calculated and displayed on Ground Control Station(s); Vehicle transitions to 
Confirmation mode  
 
Involves:   
GNSS 
Off-Board C2 Operator 
Target 













This Use Case covers the activities required to perform commanded self-destruct. 
 
Preconditions:  Vehicle is navigating in a location away from the Ground Control Station Operator 
 
Primary Flow:   
1. Operator initiates Ditch mode on Ground Control Station 
2. Ground Control Station sends Self-Destruct mode change to Vehicle 
3. Vehicle initiates Self-Destruct mode 
4. Vehicle processor sends command to A/P to crash 
5. Vehicle processor sends command to embedded self-destruct actuator 
6. Embedded self-destruct actuator initiates and destroys processor 
7. Vehicle crashes 
8. End Use Case 
 
Postconditions:  Vehicle is successfully crashed and system is inoperable by other personnel 
 







This Use Case covers the setup and mission planning for use of the Rad Search System  
 
Preconditions:   
Tasking received 
Search area defined 
Desired radionuclide(s) specified 
 
Primary Flow:   
1. Ground Crew and Ground Control Station Operator unpacks equipment 
2. Ground Crew and Ground Control Station Operator inventories equipment  
  2a. If necessary equipment missing - end Use Case 
3. Ground Crew and Ground Control Station Operator assembles equipment 
4. Ground Crew and Ground Control Station Operator initiate connection between Ground Control 
Station and Vehicle(s) 
5. Ground Control Station sends connect signal to Vehicle(s) 
6. Vehicle(s) makes connection to Ground Control Station 
  6a. If connection fails, go to step 4.  If fail 3x, end Use Case 
7. Vehicle(s) begins transmission of rad data, rad spectrum data, telemetry data, and video 
8. Ground Control Station displays rad data, rad spectrum data, telemetry data, and video 
9. Ground Control Station stores rad data, rad spectrum data, telemetry data, and video 
10. Ground Control Station Operator initiates function checks through Ground Control Station 
11. Ground Control Station initiates function checks on Vehicle(s) 
12. Vehicle(s) performs function checks and sends results to Ground Control Station 
13. Ground Control Station displays results of function checks 
14. Ground Control Station Operator confirms successful function checks. 
   14a. If function check unsuccessful, go to step 10.  If fail 3x, end Use Case. 
15. <<Include>> Perform Mission Plan 
  15a. If Mission Plan unsuccessful, repeat step 15.  If fail 3x, end Use Case 
16. End Use Case 
 
Postconditions:  System properly configured; mission planning complete; system ready for deployment 
 
Involves:   





















This Use Case covers actions associated with planning or re-planning a mission.  It can be completed 
either pre-, or post-launch. 
 
Preconditions:  Vehicle has passed function checks and has established comm with Ground Control 
Station(s)  
 
Primary Flow:   
1. Ground Control Station Operator enters Mission Plan information into Ground Control Station 
2. Ground Control Station converts Mission Plan to machine language form 
3. Ground Control Station Operator initiates Write Mission Plan function on Ground Control Station 
3. Ground Control Station sends machine language Mission Plan to Vehicle(s) 
4. Vehicle(s) puts Mission Plan into active memory 
5. Vehicle(s) sends indication of successful Mission Plan  
6. Ground Station displays indication of successful Mission Plan load 
7. End Use Case 
 
Postconditions:  Successful receipt of Mission Plan by Vehicle(s) 
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